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The majority of American jurisdictions do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract unless the breach constitutes an independent tort. Increasingly, courts and commentators have relied on the theory of “efficient breach” to explain the rule against punitive damages
in contracts. In this Article, Professor Dodge argues that economic efficiency supports a different rule—one allowing punitive damages for
any willful breach of contract.
Willful breaches fall into two categories: those that are
“opportunistic” and those that are “efficient.” An “opportunistic”
breach does not increase the size of the economic pie; the breaching
party gains simply by capturing a larger share of the pie at the expense
of the nonbreaching party. An “efficient” breach, by contrast, increases the size of the pie, allowing the breaching party to compensate
the nonbreaching party and still come out ahead. Deterring opportunistic breaches with the threat of punitive damages is efficient because such breaches by definition do not increase societal wealth.
Thus, punitive damages should be routinely available in cases of op-
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portunistic breach, such as pretextual termination, stonewalling, and
bad faith refusal to pay a debt.
Efficiency also supports extending liability for punitive damages to
those breaches that are, in theory, “efficient.” The threat of punitive
damages will not require inefficient performance because the potentially breaching party may negotiate with the other party for a release.
Relying on Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between “property
rules” and “liability rules,” Professor Dodge shows that requiring the
potentially breaching party to negotiate for a release is more efficient
than allowing her to breach and pay damages because the transaction
costs of negotiation, while not negligible, are generally lower than the
assessment costs of litigation. He also explains why other forms of
“property rule” protection, like specific performance and penalty
clauses, are insufficient to ensure that negotiation occurs before
breach.

INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, punitive damages have not been available for
breach of contract. The goal of contract remedies has been to compensate the promisee for the breach rather than to compel the promisor to perform.1 Justice Holmes wrote in The Common Law:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that
the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does
not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference
until the time for fulfilment has gone by, and therefore free to break
2
his contract if he chooses.

Although the original reasons for the rule against punitive damages in contracts are obscure,3 law and economics scholars have

1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, intro. note to ch. 16, at 100 (1981)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not
been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for
the loss resulting from breach.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970) (“Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of
promisors to prevent breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach.”).
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881).
3. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the
Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 221 (1977):
[O]ne of the principal impediments to analysis of contract cases treating the question
of punitive damages is the consistent absence, particularly in the early cases, of any
meaningful judicial discussion of the philosophy of damage law. . . . [W]e must begin
without any firm idea of why, beyond adherence to traditional English standards,

DODGE TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

04/29/99 4:24 PM

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS

631

found a contemporary justification in the theory of “efficient
breach.” As Chief Judge Posner has put it, “Holmes’s dictum . . . contains an important economic insight. In many cases it is uneconomical
to induce completion of performance of a contract.”4 If a widget
manufacturer, by breaching her contract with A and selling to B, can
make enough to compensate A for his loss and still come out ahead,
she should do so. The manufacturer is better off, A is no worse off,
and the widgets end up with B, who values them most. The manufacturer should not be liable for punitive damages because “[a] penalty
would deter efficient . . . breaches, by making the cost of the breach
to the contract breaker greater than the cost of the breach to the victim.”5 Efficient breach has now become the standard explanation of
why punitive damages are not awarded for breach of contract. The
6
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and a large number of contracts
casebooks7 and treatises8 rely on the theory of efficient breach to explain why punitive damages are not allowed. Courts have also in-

American courts have held, as a general rule, that punitive damages should not be
awarded for breach of contract.
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131 (5th ed. 1998).
5. Id. at 142.
6. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, intro. note to ch. 16, at 100 (“The answer provided
by at least some economic analysis tends to confirm the traditional response of common-law
judges in dealing with this question.”); id., reporter’s note at 101 (“To prevent [efficient breach]
by compelling performance, it is argued, would result in a less efficient distribution of wealth
since the party in breach would lose more than the injured party would gain.”); id. (“[A] breach
of contract will result in a gain in ‘economic efficiency’ if the party contemplating breach . . .
will gain enough from the breach to have a net benefit even though he compensates the other
party for his resulting loss.”).
7. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 289-91 (1995)
(discussing the similarity of “the prevailing law of contract” to that dictated by the efficient
breach hypothesis); JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 626-28
(2d ed. 1989) (excerpting an opinion by Judge Posner that gives efficient breach as the reason
for denying punitive damages); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 20-21 (5th ed. 1995) (suggesting efficient breach as a reason for denying punitive damages for breach of contract); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 71 (2d ed. 1992) (same); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M.
CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 999 (3d ed. 1993) (same).
8. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 157 (2d ed. 1998) (“Punitive
damages should not be awarded for breach of contract because they will encourage performance when breach would be socially more desirable.”); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 6, at 15 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that efficient breach analysis “is consistent with the fundamental concept of contract remedies, i.e., to compensate the injured party
by placing him in the position he would have occupied had the contract been performed”).
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creasingly turned to the theory of efficient breach to justify their
holdings denying punitive damages for breach of contract.9
There are two basic problems with the efficient breach argument
against punitive damages. First, the efficient breach argument provides no excuse for shielding opportunistic breaches of contract—
those in which the breaching party attempts to get more than she
bargained for at the expense of the nonbreaching party10—from punitive damages. As Judge Posner has recognized, when a promisor
breaches opportunistically, “we might as well throw the book at the
promisor. . . . Such conduct has no economic justification and ought
simply to be deterred.”11 Yet many courts apply the rule against punitive damages to shield not just involuntary breaches and efficient
breaches, but opportunistic breaches as well. Ironically, some have
even done so while relying on the theory of efficient breach to support their decisions.12
Second, and more fundamentally, allowing a promisor to breach
and pay only expectation damages13 is not the most efficient way to
avoid inefficient performance. Subjecting a widget manufacturer who
wishes to escape her contract with A to the threat of punitive damages will not require an inefficient performance. It will, however, lead
her to negotiate with A for a release rather than making a unilateral
decision to breach. A rule that forces such negotiation will tend to be
more efficient than a rule that allows one party to breach and pay
damages without the other party’s consent because the costs of nego-

9. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir.1988); L.L. Cole &
Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 1984); Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil
Co., 900 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1995); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436,
445 (Del. 1996); Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 984
(Ind. 1993); Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 774 (Mont. 1990); McGinnis v. Honeywell,
Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 460 (N.M. 1990); Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493,
500 (S.D. 1997).
10. See Patton, 841 F.2d at 751 (defining an opportunistic breach as one in which “the
promisor wants the benefit of the bargain without bearing the agreed-upon cost”).
11. POSNER, supra note 4, at 130.
12. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 676-77 (holding that punitive damages are not
available for withholding payment without good faith belief in right to do so); Miller Brewing
Co., 608 N.E.2d at 984 (holding that punitive damages are not available in pretextual termination cases). For further discussion of these cases and the opportunistic nature of the breaches
involved, see infra notes 169-73, 188-92 and accompanying text.
13. Expectation damages are damages that put the nonbreaching party “in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,
§ 344(a); see also id. § 347 (explaining how expectation damages are measured).
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tiation will tend to be lower than the costs of litigation necessary to
establish expectation damages.
In this Article, I argue on economic grounds that punitive damages should be available for all willful breaches of contract, including
both opportunistic breaches and efficient breaches.14 To make this argument, I rely on the analytic framework that Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed set forth in their classic article One View of the

14. Several writers have argued in favor of allowing punitive damages for opportunistic,
but not efficient, breaches of contract. See, e.g., Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64
MARQ. L. REV. 425, 443-46 (1981); Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An
Economic Argument for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic
Breach of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 877, 879-90 (1992); Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 1291, 1302, 1309-10 (1985). Other authors take a more restricted view. See, e.g., Frank
J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract—A Principled Approach, ST. MARY’S
L.J. 357, 445 (1990) (arguing that punitive damages should be allowed for an “outrageous”
breach—i.e., “an intentional breach where the defendant maliciously or oppressively caused
harm to the plaintiff”); Charles M. Louderback & Thomas W. Jurika, Standards for Limiting
the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 187, 189 (1982) (arguing that punitive damages should be allowed for bad faith breach where there is a relationship of adhesion
and dependency between the parties); Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in
Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733, 760 (1982) (arguing that punitive damages should be allowed against a “subcategory of willful breacher who knows that his
breach will have a detrimental effect on the other party but breaches anyway”).
A few other writers have advocated extending punitive damages to willful, nonopportunistic breaches in at least some instances. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 144862 (1980) (arguing that punitive damages may be justified when difficulty of detection, costs of
litigation, or difficulty measuring compensatory damages is high or when the breaching party
acted unreasonably); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 936-39 (1998) (arguing for punitive damages when a nonperforming party has a chance of escaping detection and liability); John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive
and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective
of Full Compensation, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1565, 1656-67 (1986) (arguing for punitive damages
when the breach was intentional and the breaching party knew that there was no legal justification for nonperformance); Linda Curtis, Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of
Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161, 166-70 (1986) (arguing for punitive
damages when the actual harm suffered by the nonbreaching party is greater than the compensatory damages recognized by law or when the probability of the nonbreaching party detecting
and suing for breach is less than one). However, these scholars have emphasized the role of
punitive damages in more fully compensating the nonbreaching party, see Farber, supra, at
1448-55; Sebert, supra, at 1656-67; Curtis, supra, at 168-70, or in correcting for the possibility
that the breach will not be detected, see Farber, supra, at 1455-64; Polinsky & Shavell, supra, at
936-39; Curtis, supra, at 166-68. None of them has argued, as this Article does, that punitive
damages should be allowed for willful breach of contract because it is more efficient for the
party that does not want to perform to negotiate for a release.
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Cathedral. Calabresi and Melamed identified two ways of protecting
a legal entitlement: “property rules” and “liability rules.” Property
rules require a person who wishes to remove an entitlement to negotiate with the entitlement holder.16 Liability rules allow a person to
remove the entitlement without the holder’s consent and pay an
amount determined by a court.17 Among contract remedies, expectation damages operate as a liability rule: they permit nonperformance
without the promisee’s consent upon payment of damages determined by a court. In contrast, punitive damages, in terrorem liquidated damages, and specific performance operate as property rules:
they either deter or prohibit nonperformance, and thus require the
promisor who does not wish to perform to negotiate with the promisee for a release. I argue that because the transaction costs of negotiating a release are typically lower than the assessment costs of establishing damages at trial, contractual entitlements should be
protected with property rules, including punitive damages.18 Thus,
punitive damages should be available for any willful breach.

15. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed’s
arguments about the efficiency of property rules and liability rules have prompted a large literature, much of it quite recent. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules,
105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Tally, Distinguishing]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J.
1027 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining]; Richard Craswell, Contract
Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988);
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do
Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres & Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Reply]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow &
Shavell, Property Rules]; James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Anthony T. Kronman,
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075
(1980); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997). This Article
both builds on and responds to many of these works. See infra Part II.C.2.a-d.
16. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1092.
17. See id.
18. A few writers have applied Calabresi and Melamed’s analytic framework to argue on
economic grounds for specific performance. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 15; Thomas S. Ulen,
The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
MICH. L. REV. 341, 366-71 (1984). Others have argued for liquidated damages that operate as
penalties on similar grounds without expressly invoking Calabresi and Melamed. See, e.g.,
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American law currently falls far short of this recommendation. A
majority of jurisdictions adhere to the traditional rule that bars punitive damages unless the conduct constituting the breach is also an independent tort or falls within a few other limited exceptions.19 Only a
few jurisdictions allow punitive damages against opportunistic
breachers.20 And almost none permit punitive damages simply upon a
showing of willful breach.21 American law is also currently moving in
the wrong direction. Although the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed an
increased willingness on the part of several states to permit punitive
damages for breach of contract, for the past ten years the trend
clearly has been in the other direction, with many of the leading cases
allowing punitive damages either limited or overruled.22
In Part I of this Article, I review the availability of punitive
damages for breach of contract in American law, tracing its expansion and contraction and summarizing the state of the law today. In
Part II, I argue that punitive damages should be available for any
willful breach. I begin by distinguishing between involuntary, opportunistic, and “efficient” breaches. Next, I make the relatively straightforward argument that punitive damages should be available for opportunistic breaches of contract, which by definition do not increase
societal wealth. Then, I argue that courts should allow punitive damages for all willful breaches, even those that are “efficient,” because it
is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a release from an inefficient
contract than it is to litigate the question of damages. Finally, I explain why punitive damages should not be awarded for involuntary
breaches. In Part III, I offer preliminary responses to some anticipated objections to my proposal.

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 554 (1977). However, these writers have not extended their analysis to consider how
punitive damages operate as a property rule and in what circumstances punitive damages might
be preferable to specific performance and liquidated damages, as I attempt to do. See infra Part
II.C.2.e.
19. See infra Part I.B.1.
20. See infra Part I.B.2.
21. See infra notes 88, 122 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part I.A. This trend appears to be part of a general conservative trend in contract law. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980’s: The
Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. 203 (1990); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in
Contract Law, 74 ORE. L. REV. 1131 (1995).

DODGE TO PRINTER.DOC

636

04/29/99 4:24 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[48:629

I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Section 355 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the
traditional rule: “Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach
of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for
which punitive damages are recoverable.”23 Apart from this
“independent tort” exception, there are a few other exceptions to the
rule barring punitive damages for breach of contract, exceptions
which are so well-established and so widely recognized that they
should be counted as part of the traditional rule: breach of a contract
to marry;24 breach of a contract by a public service company;25 breach
of a contract that is also a breach of a fiduciary duty;26 and, most recently, bad faith breach of an insurance contract.27 Each of these ex23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 355. The independent tort most commonly alleged in
breach of contract actions is fraud. It bears mention that making a promise without a present
intention to perform constitutes promissory fraud, which is considered a tort in most jurisdictions. See William Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in WILLIAM PROSSER,
SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 400-01 (1954) (noting that all but six American
jurisdictions recognize the tort of promissory fraud); Sebert, supra note 14, at 1607 & n.152
(citing cases).
24. See 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at 440-43 (1964); 11
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1340, at 212 (Walter H.E.
Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 222-23. Perhaps the first punitive damages
case of any kind in the United States was an action for breach of a promise to marry. See Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (N.J. 1791). The exception has been widely recognized, see, e.g.,
Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (N.C. 1976) (“North Carolina follows the
general rule that punitive or exemplary damages are not allowed for breach of contract, with
the exception of breach of contract to marry . . . .”), although at least 11 states have prohibited
suits for breach of promise to marry by statute, see Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583, 2586 & n.13 (1998) (tracing this development).
25. See, e.g., Stevenson v. John J. Grier Hotel Co., 251 S.W. 355, 355 (Ark. 1923); Milner
Hotels v. Brent, 43 So. 2d 654, 656 (Miss. 1949); see also 5 CORBIN, supra note 24, § 1077, at
443-44; 11 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 1340, at 213; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 223-25.
26. See, e.g., Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding that “imposition of
punitive damages” is appropriate for a real estate agent’s breach of “fiduciary responsibilities”); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1149 (Kan. 1978) (“This court, on several
occasions, has approved the recovery of punitive damages as well as actual damages where a
breach of a fiduciary duty is involved.”); Balsemides v. Perle, 712 A.2d 673, 685 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (“While punitive damages are usually not awarded in litigation involving
breach of a commercial contract, they may be awarded where there is a breach of trust between
the parties beyond the contractual breach.”); see also Clark v. Lubritz, 944 P.2d 861, 867 (Nev.
1997) (per curiam) (characterizing breach of fiduciary duty as an independent tort for which
punitive damages may be imposed); Holt v. Williamson, 481 S.E.2d 307, 315 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997) (same); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 226-29.
27. Courts typically distinguish between third-party cases and first-party cases. See infra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text (defining these terms). At least 45 states recognize bad
faith breach of an insurance contract as a tort in third-party cases. See Douglas R. Richmond,
An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 80 n.33
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ceptions involves a relationship with a high degree of dependence
and trust and, indeed, each appears to rest at bottom on a fiduciary
principle.28 Unless a case fits within one of these exceptions, states
following the traditional rule will not allow punitive damages “even
though the breach be wilful, malicious or oppressive.”29
A. Expansion and Backlash
A few states have long permitted punitive damages for breach of
contract even in the absence of an independent tort or one of the
other traditional exceptions. As early as 1904, South Carolina allowed punitive damages “[w]hen . . . the breach of the contract is accompanied with a fraudulent act.”30 New Mexico adopted the same
rule in 1940.31
The expansion of punitive damages for breach of contract began
in earnest in the 1970s and 1980s, with some states allowing plaintiffs

(1994) (listing cases). In first-party cases, at least 25 states, see Roger C. Henderson, The Tort
of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two Decades, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153,
1153-54 nn.2-25 (1995) (listing statutes and cases), and perhaps as many as 30 do so, see Richmond, supra, at 104 n.170 (listing cases).
28. See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy,
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 912-13, 929-38. Courts have frequently explained the imposition of punitive damages on an insurance company by describing
its relationship with the insured as similar to a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Seaman’s Direct
Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1984) (per curiam) (insurance relationship is “characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility”); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Colo. 1984) (“The standard of conduct on the part of the insurer when dealing with claims arising under an insurance policy is
shaped by, and must reflect, the quasi-fiduciary relationship that exists between the insurer and
the insured by virtue of the insurance contract.”); Romero v. Mervyn’s, 784 P.2d 992, 998 n.3
(N.M. 1989) (“We have allowed the award of punitive damages in insurance cases under a
more relaxed standard in part because of the fiduciary obligations inhering in insurance relationships . . . .”); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Wis. 1978) (“[T]he
duty on the insurance company [is] analogous to that of a fiduciary.”).
29. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (N.C. 1976).
30. Welborn v. Dixon, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (S.C. 1904). South Carolina defines “fraudulent
act” as “any act characterized by dishonesty in fact, unfair dealing, or the unlawful appropriation of another’s property by design.” Perry v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 150, 152 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
Thus, a contract plaintiff need not prove the tort of fraud to recover punitive damages.
31. See Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736, 740 (N.M. 1940) (holding that punitive damages
are permitted “where the breach of contract is accompanied by a fraudulent act”); see also
Whitehead v. Allen, 313 P.2d 335, 336 (N.M. 1957) (holding that punitive damages are permitted “if the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act, wanton in character and maliciously intentional”). The New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently clarified that a plaintiff need not
prove fraud if it could show that the contract was breached maliciously. See Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 429 P.2d 368, 378 (N.M. 1967).
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to recover punitive damages directly in contract actions32 and others
achieving the same result indirectly by characterizing some contractual breaches as torts.33 The initial impetus came from insurance
cases. In the 1973 case Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company,34 the
California Supreme Court extended tort liability for an insurer’s
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing from
third-party cases, in which the insurer refuses in bad faith to defend
or settle a claim against the insured by a third party,35 to first-party
cases, in which the insurer refuses in bad faith to pay a claim by the
insured herself.36 Three years later, in Vernon Fire & Casualty Insur37
ance Co. v. Sharp, the Indiana Supreme Court also recognized the
possibility of punitive damages for an insurer’s bad faith refusal to
pay a claim by the insured. The Indiana court did not limit its statement of the rule to the insurance context, however, concluding that
“an independent tort need not always be established”38 and that punitive damages should be available “‘[w]henever the elements of fraud,
malice, gross negligence or oppression mingle in the controversy.’”39
Moreover, the Indiana court soon applied this rule outside the insurance context, upholding the award of punitive damages in two well-

32. See, e.g., Boise Dodge v. Clark, 453 P.2d 551, 556 (Idaho 1969); Hibschman Pontiac,
Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847-48 (Ind. 1977); Romero, 784 P.2d at 998; Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 502, 503 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Hilder v. St. Peter,
478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984).
33. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 574-76 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith is a tort); Seaman’s, 686 P.2d at 1167 (same); Dold
v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972) (same); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d
1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987) (same).
Conceptualizing breach of the implied covenant of good faith as a tort is helpful in
avoiding statutes that do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract, which are found in
California, Nevada, and Montana, among others. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (1998); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(2)(a) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005(1) (1997). Otherwise, it does
not seem to make much difference for the availability of punitive damages which option a state
chooses, and this Article will not further distinguish among those states that allow punitive
damages for breach of contract in contract and those that allow them in tort.
34. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
35. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967); Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
36. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037-38.
37. 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976).
38. Id. at 180.
39. Id. (quoting Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 324 (1854)).
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known cases—Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor40 and F.D. Bork41
holder Co. v. Sandock.
While these developments in California and Indiana attracted a
good deal of attention,42 Hawaii, Idaho and Vermont were simultaneously expanding the availability of punitive damages for breach of
contract. In Dold v. Outrigger Hotel,43 the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the independent tort requirement and held that “where a contract is breached in a wanton or reckless manner as to result in a tortious injury, the aggrieved person is entitled to recover in tort.”44 In
45
Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld an
award of punitive damages, noting that “punitive damages may be assessed in contract actions where there is fraud, malice, oppression or
other sufficient reason for doing so.”46 And in Clarendon Mobile
47
Home Sales, Inc. v. Fitzgerald, the Vermont Supreme Court held
that when “the breach has the character of a wilful and wanton or
fraudulent tort, punitive damages may be allowed.”48 In explaining
why punitive damages should be allowed, these 1970s decisions often
questioned the wisdom of distinguishing sharply between contracts
and torts. They reasoned that if the defendant’s conduct was essentially tortious, it should not be immune from punitive damages simply
40. 362 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 1977) (upholding award of punitive damages, although reducing
it, for automobile dealer’s bad faith breach of warranty).
41. 413 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. 1980) (upholding award of punitive damages for contractor’s
intentional deviation from building plans).
42. Farnsworth, for example, describes Hibschman as a case in which the court went to
“considerable lengths” to find tortious conduct. FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 12.8, at 196.
Hibschman is used as a case on punitive damages in contracts in CALAMARI ET AL., supra note
7, at 635-39; THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 400-05 (2d ed. 1993); JAMES F. HOGG & CARTER G. BISHOP,
CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 511-13 (1997); and ROBERT E. SCOTT &
DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 809-13 (2d ed. 1993). Borkholder is used
as a case on punitive damages in EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW
850-53 (5th ed. 1997).
43. 501 P.2d 368 (Haw. 1972).
44. Id. at 372 (stating that a hotel’s refusal to honor reservations might warrant punitive
damages if the conduct were “deliberate or wanton”). On the facts of this case, however, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that punitive damages were not warranted. See id. at 371.
45. 453 P.2d 551 (Idaho 1969) (upholding award of punitive damages against automobile
dealership that set odometer readings back several thousand miles).
46. Boise Dodge, 453 P.2d at 553-56 (Idaho 1969). Boise Dodge is used in MURPHY ET AL.,
supra note 42, at 853-56.
47. 381 A.2d 1063 (Vt. 1977).
48. Clarendon, 381 A.2d at 1065 (emphasis added). The Vermont Supreme Court has
made it clear that proof of an independent tort is not required. See Ainsworth v. Franklin
County Cheese Corp., 592 A.2d 871, 874 (Vt. 1991).
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because it occurred in the context of a contractual relationship and
not all the elements of a tort had been proved.49
The expansion of punitive damages for breach of contract continued in the 1980s. The best known case in this expansion is the California Supreme Court’s decision in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service v.
50
Standard Oil Co. Building explicitly on its decisions in the insurance
51
context, the court held that “a party to a contract may incur tort
remedies [including punitive damages] when, in addition to breaching
the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad
faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists.”52 Seaman’s
was widely discussed in the law reviews53 and made it into a number
of casebooks.54 More importantly, Seaman’s was at least in part responsible for prompting the expansion of punitive damages for
49. See Dold, 501 P.2d at 372 (“We have recognized the fact that certain situations are so
disposed as to present a fusion of the doctrines of tort and contract.”); Boise Dodge, 453 P.2d at
556:
The rule established in Idaho is that punitive damages may be assessed in contract
actions where there is fraud, malice, oppression or other sufficient reason for doing
so. This rule recognizes that in certain cases elements of tort, for which punitive
damages have always been recoverable upon a showing of malice, may be inextricably mixed with elements of contract, in which punitive damages generally are not recoverable.
(footnote omitted); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976)
(holding that a defendant will not be shielded from punitive damages “when it appears from
the evidence as a whole that a serious wrong, tortious in nature, has been committed, but the
wrong does not conveniently fit the confines of a predetermined tort”).
50. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (per curiam).
51. See id. at 1166 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Comunale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958)).
52. Id. at 1167.
53. See, e.g., C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees—
Not Tort Liability—Is the Remedy for “Stonewalling”, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 452-60 (1987);
Sebert, supra note 14, at 1638-42; Matthew J. Barrett, Note, “Contort”: Tortious Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts—Its
Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 515-20 (1985); Sandra Chutorian,
Comment, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 377, 387-89 & passim (1986); Cohen, supra note 14, at 1296-98; James H. Cook, Comment, Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 893 (1986); John Monaghan, Note, Extending the Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General
Commercial Contracts, 65 B.U. L. REV. 355, 363-67 (1985); Eileen A. Scallen, Case Comment,
Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil
Co., 69 MINN. L. REV. 1161 (1985).
54. See CALAMARI ET AL., supra note 7, at 629-35; KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 7, at
861-73 (3d ed. 1993); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 49197 (4th ed. 1991); ARTHUR ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 447-58 (5th ed.
1994).
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breach of contract in other states, including Montana, New Mexico,
Arizona, Nevada, and Wyoming.
Montana first recognized the bad faith tort in an insurance con55
text and soon extended it to employment contracts.56 Then, its resolve apparently strengthened by Seaman’s, the Montana Supreme
Court extended the tort to contracts between two commercial parties
and upheld an award of punitive damages in Nicholson v. United Pa57
cific Insurance Co. In 1989, the New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior cases,58 holding that “punitive damages may be recovered for breach of contract when the defendant’s conduct was
malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly with a
wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s rights.”59 Citing Seaman’s, it noted
that “the award of punitive damages in some cases serves important
social ends” by deterring “[o]verreaching, malicious, or wanton conduct . . . [that] tends to undermine the stability of expectations essential to contractual relationships.”60 Seaman’s also influenced the Supreme Courts in Arizona, Nevada, and Wyoming, each of which
began to permit punitive damages in noninsurance cases where there
was a “special relationship” between the parties. 61
These 1980s decisions tended to justify awarding punitive damages somewhat differently than did the 1970s decisions. Whereas the
1970s decisions tended to question the distinction between contracts
and torts,62 the 1980s decisions explained that awarding punitive
damages in some instances could further the goals of contract law by

55. See Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970, 977 (Mont. 1982); First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. 1979).
56. See Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Mont. 1984); Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 215 (Mont. 1983).
57. 710 P.2d 1342, 1347-48 (Mont. 1985) (citing, with approval, the discussion in Seaman’s,
686 P.2d at 1161, 1166).
58. See cases cited supra note 31.
59. Romero v. Mervyn’s, 784 P.2d 992, 998 (N.M. 1989).
60. Id. at 1000-01.
61. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 574-76 (Ariz. 1986) (relying on Seaman’s and
subsequent decisions by the California Courts of Appeal); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d
1364, 1371 (Nev. 1987) (quoting, with approval, Seaman’s, 686 P.2d at 1166); Wilder v. Cody
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 221-22 (Wyo. 1994) (not discussing Seaman’s
but relying on Ponsock and other Nevada cases). Such “special relationships” extend beyond
the categories recognized under the traditional rule, see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying
text, and may include employment relationships. See, e.g., Ponsock, 732 P.2d at 1370-72;
Wilder, 868 P.2d at 221. For further discussion of the “special relationship” states, see infra Part
I.B.2.a.
62. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49.
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protecting the parties’ expectations63 and discouraging breaches that
would effectively deprive one of the parties of a contract’s benefits.64
To the extent that these 1980s decisions acknowledged the theory of
efficient breach, they viewed punitive damages as consistent with that
theory.65
Since the late 1980s, however, American contract law has experienced a backlash against punitive damages, based largely on the
theory of efficient breach. The turning point was the 1988 case Foley
66
v. Interactive Data Corp., in which the California Supreme Court refused to extend the bad faith tort to employment contracts.67 Emphasizing the traditional, compensatory role of contract remedies, the
need for predictability in commercial relationships, and the idea of
efficient breach,68 the court rejected dicta from Seaman’s suggesting

63. See, e.g., Seaman’s, 686 P.2d at 1167 (“[Stonewalling] goes beyond the mere breach of
contract. It offends accepted notions of business ethics. . . . Acceptance of tort remedies in such
a situation is not likely to intrude upon the bargaining relationship or upset reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.”) (citation omitted); Nicholson v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710
P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985) (“Where one party acts arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably,
that conduct exceeds the justifiable expectations of the second party. The second party then
should be compensated for damages resulting from the other’s culpable conduct.”); Romero,
784 P.2d at 1001 (“Overreaching, malicious, or wanton conduct such as targeted by our rule is
inconsistent with legitimate business interests, violates community standards of decency, and
tends to undermine the stability of expectations essential to contractual relationships.”).
64. See, e.g., Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 575 (“In contractual relationships in which one party
primarily has sought protection or security rather than profit or advantage, contract damages
not only fail to provide adequate compensation but also fail to provide a substantial deterrence
against breach by the party who derives a commercial benefit from the relationship.”); Ponsock, 732 P.2d at 1372 (“If all a large corporate employer had to do was to pay contract damages for this kind of conduct, it would allow and even encourage dismissals of employees on the
eve of retirement with virtual impunity.”).
65. In Nicholson, for example, the Montana Supreme Court noted that “‘[c]ontract law is
based in part upon the assumption that certain intentional breaches are to be encouraged.’” 710
P.2d at 1348 (quoting Diamond, supra note 14, at 453). The Montana court continued:
“[W]hether performing or breaching, each party has a justifiable expectation that the other will
act as a reasonable person.” Id. When the breaching party acts unreasonably, punitive damages
are appropriate. See id.
66. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
67. See id. at 389-401. The composition of the seven member court had changed dramatically between 1984 and 1988, with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Grodin and Reynoso having
been removed by election in 1986.
The previous year, the Colorado Supreme Court had reaffirmed that punitive damages
may not be recovered in breach of contract actions and had overturned a line of decisions by
the courts of appeals allowing punitive damages for breach of contract where the defendant
showed a “maleficent intent.” Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Podleski, 742 P.2d 900, 903-04 (Colo.
1987).
68. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 389.
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that employment relationships were similar to insurance contracts.69
Two years later, the Montana Supreme Court overruled Nicholson
and held that punitive damages would be allowed for breach of commercial contracts only where there was a “special relationship” between the parties.70 As the primary reason for its change of heart, the
Montana court relied on the argument that “tort damages upset[] the
concept of efficient breach.”71 In 1993, the Indiana Supreme Court,
whose decisions in Borkholder, Hibschman Pontiac, and Vernon had
been leading cases allowing punitive damages for breach of contract,72
reverted to the traditional rule and held that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages “must plead and prove the existence of an independent
tort.”73 The Indiana court reasoned that the public interest would not
be served by a policy that “prohibits one party to a contract from exercising his common law rights to breach a contract and pay a rightful
amount of compensatory damages.”74 Finally, in the 1995 case Free75
man & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., the California Supreme Court
expressly overruled Seaman’s and readopted the traditional rule.76
The California court also relied on the efficient breach argument,
noting that the traditional rule of contract damages “‘encourages efficient breaches, resulting in increased production of goods and services at lower cost to society.’”77
69. See id. at 392. Foley distinguished the insurance cases on the grounds (1) that a terminated employee could find another job while an insured could not find another insurance company to cover a loss already sustained, (2) that employers, unlike insurers, do not perform a
“quasi-public” service, and (3) that it is generally in the employer’s interest to retain good employees, whereas an insurer’s and an insured’s financial interests are always at odds once a loss
has occurred. See id. at 396.
70. See Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 774-76 (Mont. 1990).
71. Id. at 774. The court went on to observe that “efficient breach is rarely efficient
[because] the winning party must pay the cost of recovering contract damages.” Id. But it argued that “[i]n written contracts, the parties can avoid this inequity by providing in the contract
for an award of costs and attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.” Id. The court also worried
that “evidence of moral wrongdoing” pertinent to punitive damages might mislead and inflame
the jury. Id.
72. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
73. Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 984 (Ind.
1993).
74. Id. The court also noted that punitive damages might interfere with predictability, are
a “windfall” to the nonbreaching party, and might increase litigation. See id. at 981, 983-84.
75. 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
76. See id. at 679-80.
77. Id. at 676-77 (quoting Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 653-54 (Ct.
App. 1993) (citation omitted). The court also reasoned that Seaman’s had created confusion,
that punitive damages undermine stability, that such damages might be excessive, and that such
innovation was best left to the legislature. See id. at 680.
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As Montana, Indiana, and California have all retreated from allowing punitive damages in contract cases, other states have reaffirmed their adherence to the traditional rule, citing the theory of efficient breach to justify it. For example, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours
78
& Co. v. Pressman, the Supreme Court of Delaware overturned an
award of punitive damages for pretextual termination.79 It noted that
the traditional rule was “supported by the more recent theory of efficient breach” and suggested that punitive damages would “lead to inefficient results.”80 And in Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp.,81 the
South Dakota Supreme Court explained that one of the public policies underpinning its rule against punitive damages for breach of contract was that “our free market system allows economically efficient
breaches of contract, for example, when it costs less for one party to
breach an unwise contract and to pay the other party compensatory
damages than it would cost to completely perform.”82
In sum, the 1970s and early 1980s witnessed an expansion of punitive damages for breach of contract, not only in Indiana and California, but also in Hawaii, Idaho, Vermont, Montana, New Mexico,
Arizona, Nevada, and Wyoming. However, the past ten years have
seen a significant retrenchment in states like Indiana, California, and
Montana, justified by the theory of efficient breach. Meanwhile,
other states have relied on the same theory to explain their continued
adherence to the traditional rule barring punitive damages for breach
of contract.
B. Punitive Damages in Contracts: 1998
Where does the law on punitive damages for breach of contract
stand today?83 As of December 1998, thirty-nine American jurisdic-

78. 679 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
79. See id. at 448; see also id. at 446-47 (failing to take note of Freeman & Mills but relying
extensively on the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Foley). A termination is pretextual
when a party who has no legitimate basis for escaping a contract attempts to fabricate such a
basis. For further discussion of pretextual terminations, see infra Part II.B.3.a.
80. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 445-46.
81. 573 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1997).
82. Id. at 500.
83. For earlier reviews of the law on punitive damages for breach of contract, see Mark
Pennington, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A Core Sample from the Decisions of the
Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L. REV. 31 (1989); David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private
Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307 (1969); Laurence P. Simpson, Punitive Damages for
Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 284 (1959); Sullivan, supra note 3. For a discussion focus-
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tions require the plaintiff to plead and prove the existence of an independent tort to recover punitive damages in a breach of contract
suit or maintain even more stringent limits on punitive damages.84 On
the other hand, twelve states either expressly allow or appear to allow punitive damages for breach of contract under limited circumstances without proof of an independent tort.85
1. The Traditional Rule and Stricter Rules. Today, thirty-five
American jurisdictions adhere to the traditional rule86 and require
that a contract plaintiff plead and prove the existence of an
independent tort in order to recover punitive damages.87 In the
ing on Florida law, see Phyllis G. Coleman, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A New
Approach, 11 STETSON L. REV. 250 (1982).
84. See infra Part I.B.1.
85. See infra Part I.B.2.
86. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional rule).
87. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344-45 (Ala. 1997); Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54
(Alaska 1988); Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 867 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Ark. 1993); Freeman & Mills,
Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995); Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Podleski, 742
P.2d 900, 902-05 (Colo. 1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal Int’l, Inc., 672 A.2d 514, 519 (Conn. App. Ct.
1996); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996); Bernstein v.
Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1073 (D.C. 1991); Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. North Am. Van Lines,
Inc., 687 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam); Trust Co. Bank v. Citizens & S. Trust Co.,
390 S.E.2d 589, 592 (Ga. 1990); Cramer v. Insurance Exch. Agency, 675 N.E.2d 897, 904 (Ill.
1996); Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 984 (Ind. 1993);
White v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 514 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Iowa 1994); Farrell v. General Motors
Corp., 815 P.2d 538, 549 (Kan. 1991); Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844,
845 (Ky. 1986); Drinkwater v. Patten Realty Corp., 563 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 1989); Schaefer v.
Miller, 587 A.2d 491, 492 (Md. 1991); DeRose v. Putnam Mgmnt. Co., 496 N.E.2d 428, 432
(Mass. 1986); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980); Wild
v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789 (Minn. 1975) (per curiam); Peterson v. Continental Boiler
Works, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 896, 902-03 (Mo. 1990); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d
576, 580 (N.H. 1978); Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454-55 (N.J. 1993); Newton v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (N.C. 1976); Pioneer Fuels, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utils.
Co., 474 N.W.2d 706, 709 (N.D. 1991); Digital & Analog Design Corp. v. North Supply Co., 540
N.E.2d 1358, 1367 (Ohio 1989); Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla.
1975); Express Creditcorp v. Oregon Bank, 767 P.2d 493, 495-96 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Johnson
v. Hyundai Motor Am., 698 A.2d 631, 639 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Grynberg v. Citation Oil &
Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 500-01 (S.D. 1997); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d
617, 618 (Tex. 1986); Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983); Kamlar
Corp. v. Haley, 299 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. 1983); Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 381
S.E.2d 367, 374 (W. Va. 1989); Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis.
1983).
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absence of an independent tort, “[t]he general rule in most
jurisdictions is that punitive damages are not allowed even though the
88
breach be wilful, malicious or oppressive.” For example, in White v.
89
Benkowski, a case often used to illustrate the unavailability of
punitive damages,90 the Benkowskis deliberately breached a contract
to supply their neighbors, the Whites, with water.91 Although the jury
found that the Benkowskis “maliciously shut off the Whites’ water
supply for harassment purposes,”92 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed the award of punitive damages: “[P]unitive damages are not
available in breach of contract actions. This is true even if the breach,
as in the instant case, is willful.”93
Beyond these thirty-five independent-tort jurisdictions, four
states maintain even tighter limits on punitive damages in contracts,
which reflect more stringent rules on punitive damages generally.
The Nebraska Constitution prohibits all punitive damages unless
used to support the public schools.94 Louisiana and Washington do

88. Newton, 229 S.E.2d at 301 (emphasis added); see also Bernstein, 649 A.2d at 1073
(“‘Punitive damages will not lie for breach of contract, even if it is proven that the breach is
willful, wanton, or malicious.’” (quoting Bedell v. Inver Housing, Inc., 506 A.2d 202, 206 (D.C.
1986))); Drinkwater, 563 A.2d at 776 (“No matter how egregious the breach, punitive damages
are unavailable under Maine law for breach of contract . . . .”); Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov,
Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. 1996) (“[E]ven a malicious or bad-faith
motive in breaching a contract does not convert a contract action into a tort action sufficient to
support an award of . . . extra-contractual damages, such as punitive damages . . . .”) (citation
omitted); Pioneer Fuels, 474 N.W.2d at 710 (“‘A breach of contract even if intentional, malicious, or in bad faith, is not enough to convert a contract action into a tort action.’” (quoting
Hay v. Dahle, 386 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986))); Farris v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1022 (Or. 1978) (“‘Even where the breach is malicious and unjustified, exemplary damages are not allowable.’” (quoting Charles T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 286 (1935))).
89. 155 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 1967).
90. See BURTON, supra note 7, at 281-85; FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 7, at 14-17;
SCOTT & LESLIE, supra note 42, at 813-16 (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE & PRACTICE 22-26
(2d ed. 1992).
91. See White, 155 N.W.2d at 75.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 77.
94. See NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5(1) (“[A]ll fines, penalties, and license money arising under the general laws of the state . . . shall belong and be paid over to the counties respectively
where the same may be levied or imposed” and “shall be appropriated exclusively to the use
and support of the common schools.”), construed in Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v.
Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (“[P]unitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages contravene Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5, and thus are not allowed in this jurisdiction.”).
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not allow punitive damages unless expressly authorized by statute.95
And in New York, a contract plaintiff seeking punitive damages must
not only plead and prove the existence of an independent tort but
must also show that “such conduct was part of a pattern of similar
conduct directed at the public generally.”96
2. Broader Rules. Twelve states either expressly allow, or
appear to allow, punitive damages in a broader range of cases. Of
these twelve, four (Arizona, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming) may
be characterized as “special relationship” states. Eight others
(Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont) either expressly allow, or appear
to allow, a contract plaintiff to recover punitive damages without
showing either an independent tort or a special relationship.
a. “Special relationship” states. Arizona, Montana, Nevada, and
Wyoming have held that, even in the absence of an independent tort,
punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract where a
“special relationship” exists between the parties.97 The “special
relationship” idea springs from the California Supreme Court’s
opinion in Seaman’s,98 as elaborated by the California Court of
Appeal in Wallis v. Superior Court.99 Wallis listed the following
requirements for a special relationship:
(1) The contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a non-profit motivation, i.e., to secure peace of mind,
security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract damages are not
adequate because (a) they do not require the party in the superior
position to account for its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party “whole”; (4) one party is especially vulnerable because of

95. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988)
(“Under Louisiana law, punitive or other ‘penalty’ damages are not allowable unless expressly
authorized by statute.”); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441, 444 (Wash. 1981)
(“Since 1891, in an unbroken line of cases, it has been the law of this state that punitive damages are not allowed unless expressly authorized by the legislature.”).
96. Rocanova v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the United States, 634 N.E.2d 940, 944
(N.Y. 1994).
97. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 574-76 (Ariz. 1986); Story v. Bozeman, 791
P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Nev. 1987); Wilder
v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 221-22 (Wyo. 1994).
98. 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984) (per curiam).
99. 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1984).
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the type of harm it may suffer and of necessity places trust in the
other party to perform; and (5) the other party is aware of this vul100
nerability.

In some sense, this is simply an expansion of the traditional exception
allowing punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty.101 Examples
of such special relationships include insurer and insured, carrier and
passenger, innkeeper and guest, physician and patient, and attorney
and client.102 Significantly, Nevada and Wyoming have held that they
include some employment relationships.103
b. Other rules. Of the eight remaining states, Vermont and Hawaii
appear to maintain the closest tie to the “independent tort”
exception. Vermont allows punitive damages where “the breach has
the character of a wilful and wanton or fraudulent tort,”104 while
Hawaii requires the contract to have been breached “in a wanton or
reckless manner as to result in a tortious injury.”105 The Vermont
Supreme Court has, however, explicitly distinguished its own position
from the “independent tort” states,106 upholding awards of punitive
damages for the pretextual firing of an employee and for the breach
of a real estate contract that involved a good deal of reliance.107 The
Hawaii Supreme Court has always found that the breach fell short of
its standard,108 with one exception. In Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co.,109
100. Id. at 129.
101. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
102. See Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 575.
103. See K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370-72 (Nev. 1987); Wilder v. Cody
County Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 222 (Wyo. 1994); see also Garcia v. UniWyo Fed.
Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996) (“Usually, the special relationship giving employees an action on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing stems from a long term
employment relationship coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities
to the employee, e.g., benefits or commissions.”).
104. Clarendon Mobile Home Sales Inc. v. Fitzgerald, 381 A.2d 1063, 1065 (Vt. 1977).
105. Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972).
106. See Ainsworth v. Franklin County Cheese Corp., 592 A.2d 871, 874 (Vt. 1991).
107. See Ainsworth, 592 A.2d at 875 (pretextual firing); Glidden v. Skinner, 458 A.2d 1142,
1145 (Vt. 1983) (breach of contract to sell farm after plaintiffs worked for six weeks on the
farm). The Vermont Supreme Court has also stated that a landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability would warrant punitive damages, but it denied those damages in the case
in which it made the statement because the issue was waived on appeal. See Hilder v. St. Peter,
478 A.2d 202, 211 (Vt. 1984).
108. See, e.g., Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., 879 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Haw. 1994)
(breach of employment contract); Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10,
37 (Haw. 1992) (breach of indemnification agreement); Quedding v. Arisumi Bros., Inc., 661
P.2d 706, 708-10 (Haw. 1983) (per curiam) (breach of construction contract); Island Holidays,
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the Hawaii court found that a shopping mall’s actions in negotiating
with other parties after agreeing to lease space to the plaintiff “were
reprehensible and clearly amounted to wanton and/or reckless
conduct sufficient to give rise to tort liability.”110 Tort liability in
Chung, though, simply meant damages for emotional distress because
the plaintiffs had failed to appeal the trial court’s refusal to instruct
the jury on punitive damages.111 The Hawaii court’s opinion leaves
little doubt, however, that the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages
would have been upheld had the issue been preserved.
South Carolina has continued to adhere to its rule, first established in 1904, that permits punitive damages when “the breach of the
contract is accompanied with a fraudulent act.”112 Distinguishing
“fraudulent act” from the tort of fraud, South Carolina courts define
“fraudulent act” as “any act characterized by dishonesty in fact, unfair dealing, or the unlawful appropriation of another’s property by
design.”113 Despite the apparent breadth of this rule, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that “[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for the mere failure or refusal to pay a debt,”114 the paradigmatic example of an opportunistic breach.115
Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico’s rules appear to be the
broadest and seem roughly similar. Idaho permits punitive damages
for breach of contract “where there is fraud, malice, oppression or
other sufficient reason for doing so.”116 Mississippi has held that punitive damages “‘are recoverable where the breach results from an intentional wrong, insult, or abuse as well as from such gross negligence
as constitutes an independent tort.’”117 And New Mexico has held that
Inc. v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 884, 894 (Haw. 1978) (breach of commercial lease agreement);
Uyemura v. Wick, 551 P.2d 171, 175 (Haw. 1976) (breach of contract to sell real estate); Dold,
501 P.2d at 370-71 (breach of contract between hotel and guest).
109. 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980).
110. Id. at 289.
111. See id. at 287 n.4.
112. Welborn v. Dixon, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (S.C. 1904).
113. Perry v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 150, 152 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
114. Vann v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 185 S.E.2d 363, 364 (S.C. 1971).
115. See infra Part II.B.3.c (discussing bad faith refusal to pay a debt).
116. Boise Dodge v. Clark, 453 P.2d 551, 556 (Idaho 1969). The Idaho Supreme Court has
also stated that punitive damages should be allowed “where the breaking of a promise [is] an
extreme deviation from standards of reasonable conduct, and [is] done with knowledge of its
likely effects.” Linscott v. Rainier Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 964 (Idaho 1980).
117. American Funeral Assurance Co. v. Hubbs, 700 So. 2d 283, 286 (Miss. 1997) (quoting
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Maas, 516 So. 2d 495, 496 (Miss. 1987)). Some Mississippi cases
employ a slightly different verbal formulation, holding that punitive damages may be recovered
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punitive damages may be recovered for breach of contract when the
defendant’s conduct was “‘malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or
committed recklessly with a wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s
rights.’”118 The apparent similarity disguises some differences in results, though. Each of these states seems to allow punitive damages
for opportunistic breaches like pretextual termination,119 stonewalling,120 or bad faith refusal to pay.121 Idaho and Mississippi, however,
seem to allow punitive damages merely upon a showing of willfulness,122 while the New Mexico Supreme Court has refused to award
punitive damages simply on the basis that the breach was willful.123

if the breach “is attended by intentional wrong, insult, abuse or such gross negligence as to consist of an independent tort.” Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Keyes, 317 So. 2d 396, 398 (Miss.
1975). Cases employing this formulation make clear that the “independent tort” language
modifies only “gross negligence.” See, e.g., Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So. 2d
539, 544 (Miss. 1996) (holding that trial judge erred by refusing a punitive damage instruction
after finding an “intentional wrong”); Polk v. Sexton, 613 So. 2d 841, 845 (Miss. 1993) (holding
that lying to get out of an option to sell commercial property constitutes a “gross and wilful”
breach of contract justifying punitive damages).
118. Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 879 P.2d 772, 775
(N.M. 1994) (quoting Romero v. Mervyn’s, 784 P.2d 992, 998 (N.M. 1989)). The New Mexico
Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he courts of New Mexico do not distinguish between tort
and contract in the application of punitive damages.” Hood v. Fulkerson, 699 P.2d 608, 611
(N.M. 1985).
119. See, e.g., Willard, 681 So. 2d at 544 (“[A] reasonable jury could find [that the pretextual firing was] an intentional wrong . . . necessitating the imposition of punitive damages.”).
For further discussion of pretextual termination as an example of opportunistic breach, see infra Part II.B.3.a.
120. See, e.g., Romero, 784 P.2d at 1001 n.6 (“[L]ogic suggests that punitive damages be
available when a party has breached a contract believing the wronged party cannot afford to
contest the matter in court.”). For further discussion of stonewalling as an example of opportunistic breach, see infra Part II.B.3.b.
121. See, e.g., DynaSteel Corp. v. Aztec Indus., 611 So. 2d 977, 984 (Miss. 1992) (holding
that bad faith refusal to pay for work done pursuant to a contract “is a ground upon which punitive damages may legitimately be granted”). For further discussion of bad faith refusal to pay
as an example of opportunistic breach, see infra Part II.B.3.c.
122. See Mitchell v. Barendregt, 820 P.2d 707, 718 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
jury must be instructed on punitive damages in a case involving a “deliberate or willful” breach
of contract to buy potatoes (quoting White v. Doney, 351 P.2d 380 (Idaho 1960))); Davis v.
Gage, 682 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (upholding punitive damages for “willful,
wanton, malicious” breach of a covenant not to compete); Polk, 613 So. 2d at 845 (allowing
punitive damages upon a finding of “gross and willful” breach).
123. See Construction Contracting & Mgmnt. v. McConnell, 815 P.2d 1161, 1165-66 (N.M.
1991) (stating that punitive damages are generally not available “[a]bsent a showing of malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, or conduct committed recklessly with a wanton disregard for the wronged party’s rights”). New Mexico has also apparently accepted Judge Posner’s
“efficient breach” argument. See McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 460 (N.M. 1990)
(citing Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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Finally, there is language in both Rhode Island and Tennessee
cases that would support the awarding of punitive damages for some
breaches of contract. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated
that “punitive damages do not lie in [contract] actions, absent the
most egregious circumstances.”124 Similarly, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals has recently stated that while “as a general rule punitive
damages are not proper in breach of contract cases . . . exceptions
[exist] in cases involving ‘fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression.’”125 Despite these statements, there appear to be no cases in either Rhode Island or Tennessee that have actually upheld an award
of punitive damages.
Thus, while a significant minority of states do permit punitive
damages for some breaches of contract, most states do not. Moreover, as I have already noted, the current trend is in the direction of
contracting rather than expanding the availability of punitive damages.
II. THE CASE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
It is necessary, at the outset, to distinguish among involuntary,
opportunistic, and efficient breaches. After explaining those distinctions in Section II.A, my argument proceeds in two parts. In Section
II.B, I argue that punitive damages should be awarded to deter opportunistic breaches of contract. I also discuss three examples of opportunistic breach—pretextual termination, stonewalling, and bad
faith refusal to pay—in order to show that many states are unwisely
prohibiting punitive damages in cases of opportunistic breach. In Section II.C, I argue on economic grounds that punitive damages should
be available for any willful breach of contract, even if that breach is
“efficient.”
A. Three Kinds of Breaches
In discussing the proper remedy for breach of contract, it is useful to distinguish among different kinds of breaches.126 First, we may
divide breaches into two basic categories: involuntary and willful. In-

124. O’Coin v. Woonsocket Instit. Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1266 (R.I. 1988).
125. Medley v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 912 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citations
omitted) (quoting Bryson v. Bramlett, 321 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tenn. 1958)).
126. See generally POSNER, supra note 4, at 130-31 (distinguishing involuntary, opportunistic, and efficient breaches); Patton, 841 F.2d at 751 (same).
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advertently installing the wrong kind of pipe in a house would be an
involuntary breach.127 So would breaching a contract in the good faith
belief that some defense like impossibility excused performance,
even though a court later determined that the requirements for the
defense had not been met, because the promisor would not think at
the time that she was voluntarily breaching the contract. The category of willful breach, on the other hand, includes any deliberate
breach. A party who withholds payment in bad faith after the other
party has performed is breaching willfully. So, too, is a party who deliberately decides not to perform because performance has become
more expensive than anticipated (though not so expensive as to raise
the defense of impossibility) or because a better opportunity has
come along.
Willful breaches may be further subdivided into two categories:
opportunistic and efficient. A breach is opportunistic if the breaching
party attempts to get more than he bargained for at the expense of
the nonbreaching party.128 “The opportunistic actor creates more
value for himself, but only by taking an equivalent amount or more
from others.”129 For example, a party who withholds payment in bad
faith after the other party has performed in the hope of obtaining a
reduction in the contract price is breaching opportunistically.130 By
contrast, a breach is efficient if it makes the breaching party so much
127. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921) (“The evidence sustains a finding that the omission of the prescribed brand of pipe was neither fraudulent nor willful. It was the result of oversight and inattention of the plaintiff’s subcontractor.”).
128. See Patton, 841 F.2d at 751 (defining an opportunistic breach as one where “the promisor wants the benefit of the bargain without bearing the agreed-upon cost”); Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1139 n.118 (1981)
(“[O]pportunistic behavior only redistributes portions of an already allocated contractual
pie.”); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV.
521, 521 (1981) (“[Opportunism] occurs when a performing party behaves contrary to the other
party’s understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit
terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer . . . .”).
Others have defined “opportunism” as taking advantage of the other party’s vulnerability, see Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 337 (1980), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 16, 17
(Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989), as “self-interest seeking with guile,” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985), or as “any contractual conduct by
one party contrary to the other party’s reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or conventional morality,” George M. Cohen, The NegligenceOpportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 957 (1992) (footnotes omitted). For the purposes of this Article, however, the narrower “trying to get more than you bargained for” definition will suffice.
129. Perlstein, supra note 14, at 880.
130. For further examples of opportunistic breaches, see infra Part II.B.3.
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better off that she could compensate the nonbreaching party for his
losses and still come out ahead. For example, if a widget manufacturer, by breaching her contract with A and selling to B, can make
enough to compensate A for his losses and still be better off, it would
be efficient for her to breach the contract with A.131 If the breaching
party is required to compensate the nonbreaching party, the breach is
Pareto efficient; if the breaching party is not required to do so, the
breach is simply Kaldor-Hicks efficient.132 Discussions of efficient
breach generally employ the Pareto understanding of efficiency because they assume the availability of expectation damages, which are
designed to ensure that the nonbreaching party is compensated for
his losses,133 and I, too, will use Pareto efficiency in making my argument. Thus, the distinction between opportunistic and efficient
breaches, as I have defined them, boils down to this: An opportunistic breach does not increase the size of the economic pie; the breaching party gains simply by capturing a larger share of the pie at the expense of the nonbreaching party. An efficient breach, on the other
hand, increases the size of the pie, allowing the breaching party more
without decreasing the amount that the nonbreaching party receives.
We are left, then, with three basic kinds of breaches: involuntary,
opportunistic, and efficient. Both opportunistic and efficient breaches
fall into the category of willful breaches. Because contractual liability
is strict liability, even an involuntary breacher is liable for damages,
but no one—myself included—argues that an involuntary breach of
contract should subject the breacher to punitive damages.134 The
question, then, is whether punitive damages should not be allowed
for any breach of contract, whether they should be allowed for opportunistic but not efficient breaches, or whether they should be allowed
for all willful breaches, even those that are efficient. The traditional
rule, adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and followed
in a majority of states, does not allow punitive damages in the ab-

131. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 133; Patton, 841 F.2d at 750.
132. A transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if increases net wealth, regardless of any
change in wealth distribution. In other words, a transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the
gainers gain more than the losers lose. By contrast, a transaction is Pareto efficient if it results
in a net increase in wealth and no person is made worse off by the transaction. Pareto efficiency’s second criterion requires that gainers compensate losers for any losses caused by the
transaction. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41-42
(2d ed. 1997) (explaining and distinguishing between these two concepts).
133. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 133 (describing a Pareto-efficient breach).
134. For further discussion, see infra Part II.D.
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sence of an independent tort, even if the breach is opportunistic.135
Judge Posner approves of punitive damages for opportunistic
breaches,136 but not for efficient ones.137 I agree with Judge Posner
that punitive damages should be available to discourage opportunistic breaches of contract,138 but I go further and argue that punitive
damages should be available for all willful breaches of contract, even
those that are “efficient.”139
B. Punitive Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract
As I will demonstrate below, opportunistic breaches of contract
are inefficient. They not only fail to create wealth, but actually consume it. Compensatory damages are not sufficient to deter these
breaches, and thus punitive damages are necessary.140 In the absence
of an independent tort, however, the traditional rule shields opportunistic breachers from punitive damages, encouraging inefficient
opportunism.
1. The Inefficiency of Opportunism. By definition, opportunistic
behavior does not create wealth but simply redistributes wealth from
one party to another.141 Indeed, opportunism actually consumes
existing wealth because “potential opportunists and victims expend
resources perpetrating and protecting against opportunism.”142 The
opportunist may expend resources looking for loopholes in a contract
or trying to make its cheating more difficult to detect. The victim, on
the other hand, may try to guard against opportunistic behavior by
investigating its prospective contractual partners more carefully, by
drafting a more detailed contract, or by spending more resources
monitoring the other party’s performance.143 None of these

135. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
136. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 130 (recommending that the law “throw the book” at opportunistic parties).
137. See id. at 142 (discussing “good reasons for not awarding punitive damages for nonopportunistic breaches”).
138. See infra Part II.B.
139. See infra Part II.C.
140. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 130; Perlstein, supra note 14, at 881-90.
141. See Cohen, supra note 128, at 973; Perlstein, supra note 14, at 879-80.
142. Muris, supra note 128, at 524.
143. See id.
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expenditures increases society’s total wealth.144 Thus, as Judge Posner
recognizes, the law should discourage opportunistic breaches of
contract:
It makes a difference in deciding which remedy to grant whether the
breach was opportunistic. If a promisor breaks his promise merely to
take advantage of the vulnerability of the promisee in a setting (the
normal contract setting) where performance is sequential rather
than simultaneous, we might as well throw the book at the promisor.
An example would be where A pays B in advance for goods and instead of delivering them B uses the money in another venture. Such
conduct has no economic justification and ought simply to be de145
terred.

2. Compensatory Damages Do Not Discourage Opportunism.
Compensatory damages are not sufficient to discourage opportunism.
An opportunistic breacher will sometimes escape liability, either
because the nonbreaching party fails to detect the breach or because
the nonbreaching party cannot afford to bring suit to enforce his
rights. If an opportunistic breacher need only pay compensatory
damages when she is held liable and can keep her opportunistic gains
when she is not, opportunism may prove to be a profitable strategy.146
The Nevada Supreme Court made exactly this point in upholding
punitive damages for the pretextual firing of an employee in order to
deny him retirement benefits:
If all a large corporate employer had to do was to pay contract damages for this kind of conduct, it would allow and even encourage
dismissals of employees on the eve of retirement with virtual impunity. Having to pay only contract damages would offer little or no

144. See Cohen, supra note 128, at 973-74 (“Investments in opportunistic behavior and in
taking precautions against such behavior can therefore be viewed as ‘deadweight losses,’ that is,
decreases in society’s total wealth.”).
145. POSNER, supra note 4, at 130; see also id. at 103 (“[T]he fundamental function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since Hobbes’s day) is to deter people from behaving
opportunistically toward their contracting parties . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Muris, supra note
128, at 532-88 (discussing ways in which contract law attempts to discourage opportunism).
146. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 14, at 936-37 (“[T]he award of punitive damages
sometimes can promote the interests of contracting parties—when a non-performing party has
a chance of escaping detection and liability.”); Curtis, supra note 14, at 163 (“[E]xtracontractual damages are justified on efficiency grounds . . . where the probability of the victim
detecting and suing for breach is less than one . . . .”).
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deterrent to the type of practice apparently engaged in by K Mart in
147
this case.

In his discussion of opportunistic breaches, Judge Posner suggests that the opportunistic breacher be made to pay restitution of
any benefits received from the breach. “We can deter this kind of behavior by making it worthless to the promisor, which we do by making him hand over all his profits from the breach to the promisee; no
lighter sanction would deter.”148 Because there is at least some chance
that the opportunistic breacher will not be held liable at all, however,
restitution alone is not sufficient to deter opportunistic breaches.
Perhaps for this reason, Judge Posner approves of what he sees as a
judicial trend towards awarding “punitive damages . . . as a sanction
for opportunistic breaches.”149
Unfortunately, no such trend exists. Most opportunistic breaches
of contract do not constitute “independent torts.” Thus, punitive
damages are not available to deter them in those states that follow
the traditional rule. Even among the relatively few states that permit
punitive damages in the absence of an independent tort, several do
not permit punitive damages for some opportunistic breaches.150 Indeed, the current trend is against imposing punitive damages for
breach of contract—even for opportunistic breaches151—and, ironi-

147. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1987).
148. POSNER, supra note 4, at 130-31.
149. Id. at 142. Judge Posner’s perception of such a trend likely stems in part from his exposure to Indiana law in Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, 841 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1988). Prior to
1993, Indiana was one of the leading states in allowing punitive damages for breach of contract.
See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. In Patton, Judge Posner concluded that opportunism “seems the common element in most of the Indiana cases that have allowed punitive
damages to be awarded in breach of contract cases.” Patton, 841 F.2d at 751. The Indiana Supreme Court has subsequently overruled this line of cases and now requires a plaintiff seeking
punitive damages to plead and prove the existence of an independent tort. See Miller Brewing
Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 981-84 (Ind. 1993); supra notes 72-74
and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Vann v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 185 S.E.2d 363, 364 (S.C. 1971) (holding that
punitive damages are not available for bad faith refusal to pay a debt). Arizona, Montana, Nevada and Wyoming do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract unless there is a
“special relationship” between the parties. See supra Part I.B.2.a. Thus, in these states, opportunistic breaches that occur outside such relationships are not subject to punitive damages.
151. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995)
(holding that punitive damages are not available for bad faith refusal to pay a debt); Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 (Cal. 1988) (holding that punitive damages are not
available for pretextual termination of an employment contract). For further discussion of the
opportunistic nature of the breaches in Freeman & Mills and Foley, see infra text accompanying notes 158-63, 188-92.
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cally, courts are increasingly relying on the theory of efficient breach
in refusing to impose punitive damages.152
3. A Few Examples of Opportunistic Breach. Opportunistic
breaches come in many varieties. To illustrate the points made above,
I will concentrate on just a few: pretextual termination of a contract;
stonewalling; and bad faith refusal to pay for services already
performed.
a. Pretextual termination. One common sort of opportunistic
breach is the termination of a contract on pretextual grounds—a
party who has no legitimate basis for escaping the contract attempts
to fabricate such a basis. Pretextual termination often occurs in the
context of an employment relationship. In one common scenario, the
employer creates “cause” for firing an employee in order to deny the
employee retirement or severance benefits. In K Mart Corp. v. Pon153
sock, for example, the plaintiff Ponsock, a fork-lift driver and a
tenured employee, was fired after nine and a half years of service
when he was approximately six months away from full vesting of his
retirement benefits.154 Ponsock was fired for defacing company property and misappropriating merchandise after he used a discarded can
of spray paint to cover a sticky area on his forklift.155 The Nevada Supreme Court held that Ponsock was entitled to recover in tort because K Mart had discharged him “in bad faith for the improper motive of defeating contractual retirement benefits”156 and upheld an
award of punitive damages.157

152. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
153. 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987).
154. See id. at 1366.
155. See id. at 1366-67.
156. Id. at 1370.
157. See id. at 1373. The Vermont Supreme Court has also upheld an award of punitive
damages where the defendant “fabricated grounds for termination solely to deny plaintiff his
severance allowance.” Ainsworth v. Franklin County Cheese Corp., 592 A.2d 871, 875 (Vt.
1991); see also Garcia v. UniWyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996) (“Usually,
the special relationship giving employees an action on the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing stems from a long term employment relationship coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the employee, e.g., benefits or commissions.”).
If the employment is at will and the fabricated grounds for termination do not deny the
employee any contractual rights, then fabricating those grounds would not constitute a breach
of the employment contract, much less an opportunistic one. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1038-41 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that termination without cause does
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Other courts, however, have not been willing to allow punitive
damages for pretextual firings. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,158
the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged an implied-in-fact contract limiting the defendant’s right to
discharge him without cause, which the defendant had breached by
firing him pretextually.159 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff should be limited to expectation damages,160 rejecting dicta in
Seaman’s that had suggested that punitive damages might be available for bad faith breach of an employment contract.161 In rejecting
the Seaman’s dicta, the Foley court relied on the theory of efficient
breach.162 The problem, of course, is that a pretextual firing, which
denies an employee his contractual right to be discharged only for
cause, or only after following an agreed procedure, or to retirement
or severance benefits, is not Pareto efficient—it is opportunistic. The
employer is not compensating the employee for the loss of his contractual rights, as would be the case in an efficient breach scenario; it
is attempting to benefit precisely by denying the employee those
rights. In short, the employer is attempting to get more than it bargained for at the expense of the employee.163
The problem of pretextual termination is not limited to employment contracts. In Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance Co.,164
the defendant precipitated disputes over plans for a renovation as a
justification for rescinding a commercial lease.165 The Montana Supreme Court upheld the jury’s award of punitive damages on the
ground that the defendant’s breach amounted to “oppression, fraud
not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an at-will employment relationship).
158. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
159. See id. at 387-88.
160. See id. at 396.
161. See id. at 392.
162. See id. at 389 n.25 (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, reporter’s note to ch.
16, at 101-02 (“[A] breach of contract will result in a gain in ‘economic efficiency’ if the party
contemplating breach evaluates his gains at a higher figure than the value that the other party
puts on his losses . . . .”)).
163. One other employment case deserves brief mention. In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996), the Delaware Supreme Court held that punitive damages were not available for pretextual breach of an employment contract. See id. at 445-48.
That holding would appear to shield opportunistic breaches of employment contracts from punitive damages. Nevertheless, the result in Pressman may have been correct because the plaintiff was an at-will employee, see id. at 442, and therefore his termination, though pretextual,
was not opportunistic. See supra note 157.
164. 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
165. See id. at 1344.
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or malice.”166 The Montana Supreme Court, however, has since overruled Nicholson’s holding on punitive damages and now requires
proof of a “special relationship” between the parties,167 which specifically excludes commercial contracts.168 Another example from outside
the employment context is Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of
169
Bloomington, Inc., a case in which the defendant had fabricated
grounds for terminating a distributorship contract to escape the effect
of a state statute protecting beer wholesalers from unfair terminations that had been expressly incorporated into the contract.170 The
Indiana Supreme Court, overturning several of its past decisions,171
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages for the
pretextual termination of its distributorship agreement unless it could
“plead and prove the existence of an independent tort.”172 In limiting
the availability of punitive damages for pretextual terminations, both
the Indiana and the Montana courts relied on the theory of efficient
breach.173 But the pretextual terminations involved in all of these
cases were not Pareto efficient. In each case, the defendant who created the pretext for terminating the agreement was seeking to benefit
at the expense of the plaintiff by denying the plaintiff its contractual
rights without compensation.

166. Id. at 1348. The Mississippi Supreme Court has also upheld an award of punitive damages in the context of a commercial lease. See Polk v. Sexton, 613 So. 2d 841, 845 (Miss. 1993).
Sexton had leased commercial space from Polk with an option to buy at a specified price. See
id. at 842. Polk subsequently told Sexton he could not sell her the property because his bank
would not allow it. See id. at 843. In fact, the bank had never been asked, and Polk declined to
sell because the property was worth twice what he had agreed to sell it for. See id. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Polk’s breach was “gross and willful” and
affirmed the award of punitive damages. See id. at 845.
167. See Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775-76 (Mont. 1990).
168. See id. at 776 (“‘[T]he motivation for entering the contract must be a non-profit motivation . . . .’” (quoting Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1984))).
169. 608 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. 1993).
170. See id. at 976-79.
171. See supra notes 37-41, 72-74 and accompanying text.
172. Miller, 608 N.E.2d at 984.
173. See id. at 984 (holding that the public interest is not served by a policy that “prohibits
one party to a contract from exercising his common law rights to breach a contract and pay a
rightful amount of compensatory damages”); Story, 791 P.2d at 774 (“Primarily, the specter of
tort damages upsets the concept of efficient breach. Parties have traditionally been free to
breach their contract and pay contract damages whenever performance was not economically
efficient.”).
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b. Stonewalling. The classic “stonewalling” case is Seaman’s Direct
174
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California. According to
Seaman’s, it had entered a contract in 1972 under which Standard
agreed to supply fuel for its marine fuel dealership.175 Following the
Arab oil embargo, Standard tried a number of ways to get out of its
obligation176 and ultimately just denied that any contract existed.177
After noting that punitive damages would be available for
threatening to bring a lawsuit in bad faith, the California Supreme
Court wrote:
There is little difference, in principle, between a contracting party
obtaining excess payment [by threatening to bring a lawsuit], and a
contracting party seeking to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by adopting a “stonewall” position (“see you in court”)
without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a defense. Such conduct goes beyond the mere breach of contract. It of178
fends accepted notions of business ethics.

In the end, the Seaman’s court limited its holding to allowing punitive
damages for “denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that
the contract exists.”179 The New Mexico Supreme Court has endorsed
180
Seaman’s on this point.
Stonewalling, however, is not generally recognized as an
“independent tort.”181 Thus, punitive damages are not available to de-

174. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (per curiam).
175. See id. at 1160-61.
176. See id. at 1161-62.
177. See id. at 1162 (“Seaman’s asked Standard to stipulate to the existence of a contract,
explaining that it could not continue in operation throughout the time that a trial would take.
In reply, Standard’s representative laughed and said, ‘See you in court.’”).
178. Id. at 1167.
179. Id.
180. In Romero v. Mervyn’s, 784 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1989), the court stated:
[P]unitive damages long have been recognized as an appropriate remedy in situations in which exposure merely to compensatory damages is an inadequate deterrent
to prevent such oppressive conduct. . . . [L]ogic suggests that punitive damages be
available when a party has breached a contract believing the wronged party cannot
afford to contest that matter in court.
Id. at 1001 n.6 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1000 (“‘Acceptance of tort remedies [for a bad
faith breach of contract] is not likely to intrude upon the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.’” (quoting Seaman’s, 686 P.2d at 1167)). The Romero court did not actually
have to decide this issue because there was insufficient evidence that Mervyn’s was
“stonewalling.” See id. at 1000 n.6.
181. In New Hampshire, raising a defense in bad faith is a tort. See Aranson v. Schroeder,
671 A.2d 1023, 1028 (N.H. 1995) (recognizing the common law tort of “malicious defense”).
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ter stonewalling in most states. The Iowa Supreme Court has recently
made this explicit in overturning an award of punitive damages:
The [trial] court also based its punitive damage award on a finding that [medical] payments were denied in an effort to force White
to settle his claim. Again, however, we are confronted with a claim
that is not recognized in tort. While we agree that US West’s treatment of White was shabby, merely objectionable conduct is insuffi182
cient . . . .

Moreover, the California Supreme Court has recently overruled
Seaman’s, citing the theory of efficient breach as one reason for doing
so.183 But stonewalling is not Pareto efficient—by definition, a stonewalling party is not agreeing to pay the other party’s expectation
damages. When a party denies liability in bad faith, hoping that the
other party will not be able to afford to litigate or will be forced to
settle for less than it is entitled to, it is acting opportunistically, hoping to benefit at the other party’s expense.184
c. Bad faith refusal to pay. Perhaps the paradigmatic example of an
opportunistic breach is when one party refuses to perform its part of
the bargain after the other party has performed.185 One state has expressly held that an “obstinate and willful refusal to pay . . . is a
ground upon which punitive damages may legitimately be granted.”186
But this is highly unusual, and even some states that generally allow
punitive damages for breach of contract deny such damages for willful refusal to pay a debt.187

However, New Hampshire appears to be alone in recognizing malicious defense as a tort. See
infra note 346 and accompanying text.
182. White v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 514 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Iowa 1994).
183. See Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 676-77 (Cal. 1995) (stating
that the rule against punitive damages “‘encourages efficient breaches, resulting in increased
production of goods and services at lower cost to society’” (quoting Harris v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 653-54 (Ct. App. 1993))).
184. See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (giving as an example of an opportunistic breacher “the promisor [who] wants the benefit of the bargain without
bearing the agreed-upon cost, and exploits the inadequacies of purely compensatory remedies”).
185. See supra text accompanying note 130.
186. DynaSteel Corp. v. Aztec Indus., 611 So. 2d 977, 984 (Miss. 1992) (internal quotation
omitted).
187. See, e.g., Vann v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 185 S.E.2d 363, 364 (S.C. 1971) (“Punitive damages are not recoverable for the mere failure or refusal to pay a debt.”). Presumably, states that
require a “special relationship” between the parties in order to award punitive damages, see
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Take the California Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman &
188
Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. —the case that overruled Seaman’s—as
an example. Belcher Oil had retained the law firm of Morgan, Lewis
and Bockius to defend it in a lawsuit. With Belcher’s approval, Morgan retained Freeman & Mills, an accounting firm, to provide financial analysis. Ultimately, Belcher discharged Morgan and refused to
pay for the services Freeman & Mills had rendered.189 The jury found
that “Belcher Oil had denied the existence of the contract and had
acted with oppression, fraud, or malice,” and awarded Freeman &
Mills punitive as well as compensatory damages.190 The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal, which had
reversed the trial court’s judgment.191 Perhaps because the court was
focused on whether it should overrule Seaman’s, its discussion completely ignored the facts of the case before it: the court relied on the
theory of “efficient breach” in readopting the traditional rule barring
punitive damages in contracts192 even though the breach in Freeman
& Mills was not Pareto efficient. If one accepts the jury’s finding of
bad faith as true, as the Freeman & Mills court was required to do,
then Belcher’s breach was a classic example of opportunism—
Belcher was refusing to pay for services it had already received without any good faith belief that it was entitled to do so.
d. Conclusion. The three kinds of opportunistic breaches discussed
here obviously do not exhaust the possibilities. But the cases decided
in each of these areas do show that many courts are failing to distinguish between opportunistic and efficient breaches of contract and
are improperly relying on the theory of efficient breach to shield opportunistic breaches of contract from punitive damages. To repeat
Judge Posner’s words, when a promisor breaches opportunistically,
“we might as well throw the book at the promisor. . . . Such conduct
has no economic justification and ought simply to be deterred.”193

supra Part I.B.2.a, also would not award punitive damages for bad faith refusal to pay a debt in
the absence of such a relationship.
188. 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
189. See id. at 670-71.
190. Id. at 671.
191. See id. at 680.
192. See id. at 676-77.
193. POSNER, supra note 4, at 130.
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C. Punitive Damages for “Efficient” Breach of Contract
Although Judge Posner would allow punitive damages to discourage opportunistic breaches of contract, he would not allow punitive damages for other willful breaches. He explains:
Even if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy.
The promisor may simply have discovered that his performance is
worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses. If he is forced to pay more than that, an efficient
breach may be deterred, and the law doesn’t want to bring about
194
such a result.

In this section, I argue that Judge Posner’s analysis is wrong. Allowing a party to breach a contract and pay damages is not as efficient as
forcing that party, with the threat of punitive damages, to negotiate
with the other party for a release from the contract.
1. The Efficient Breach Argument. Sometimes it is more efficient not to perform a contract. The seller might receive a better offer from a second buyer, or the buyer might receive a better offer
from a second seller; the seller might find that its cost of performance
has risen, or the buyer might find that the value of performance has
diminished.195 To take the first possibility as an illustration,196 assume
that a manufacturer has agreed to produce widgets for A. After the
contract is made, B comes along and offers a better price. If the
manufacturer can make enough by selling to B to compensate A for
his loss and still come out ahead, then it would be efficient for her to
breach the contract with A and sell to B. The widgets will end up in
the hands of the party that values them most.197 Moreover, B is better
off, the seller is better off, and A is no worse off—a Pareto-superior
result. Expectation damages, the argument goes, promote efficiency

194. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988).
195. See generally Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J.
ECON. 466, 473-74 (1980) (analyzing these four possibilities).
196. The seller who receives a better offer from a second buyer is the most commonly used
example of efficient breach, but the same basic analysis applies to the other examples noted in
the text. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 634 & n.6.
197. The widgets could also end up in the hands of the party who values them most if B had
negotiated with A for an assignment of A’s contractual rights or if A had taken delivery of the
widgets and resold them to B.
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because they permit such efficient breaches.198 Punitive damages, on
the other hand, deter efficient breaches because they require the
breaching party to pay more than the nonbreaching party’s actual
losses.199
There are a number of problems with this analysis, several of
which other writers have already identified. First, the efficient breach
argument assumes that the breaching party willingly agrees to make
good the nonbreaching party’s actual losses and does not try to take
advantage of the costs of litigation to avoid paying altogether or to
force the nonbreaching party to settle for less than his actual damages. So many breaching parties act opportunistically in refusing to
pay damages, though, that one may wonder whether a separate category of “efficient” breaches even exists:200 “[T]he voluntary payor is
so rare as to be an almost purely hypothetical figure.”201 Second, the
efficient breach argument assumes that expectation damages do, in
fact, put the nonbreaching party in as good a position as performance. As a number of writers have pointed out, though, the requirements of certainty and foreseeability and the fact that nonbreaching
parties typically may not recover for emotional distress, attorneys’
fees, or prejudgment interest means that expectation damages generally fail to compensate the nonbreaching party fully.202 If the breaching party is not responsible for the nonbreaching party’s full losses,
then there is an incentive to breach even when the breach would not
be efficient.203 While a few writers have advocated punitive damages
as a way of remedying these problems with the efficient breach ar-

198. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 132-33. The earliest expressions of this idea are found in
Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970) and John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach
of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972).
199. See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (“If
[the promisor] is forced to pay more than [the promisee’s actual losses], an efficient breach may
be deterred, and the law doesn’t want to bring about such a result.”); P OSNER, supra note 4, at
142 (“A penalty would deter efficient as well as inefficient breaches, by making the cost of the
breach to the contract breaker greater than the cost of the breach to the victim . . . .”).
200. See supra Part II.B.3.b-c (discussing “stonewalling” and bad faith refusal to pay as examples of opportunistic breach).
201. Putz & Klippen, supra note 53, at 431.
202. See sources listed supra at note 14; sources listed infra at note 205.
203. See, e.g., Sebert, supra note 14, at 1573 (“By systematically undercompensating plaintiffs, we risk encouraging too much breach rather than too little.”).
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gument,204 the more common proposal is to reform expectation damages to make them more fully compensatory.205
My argument is different from these. I am willing to assume that
a breacher will voluntarily pay the nonbreaching party’s expectation
damages (although she may in good faith dispute the amount of those
damages) and that expectation damages are sufficient to put the nonbreaching party in the same position as performance. Even with these
assumptions, however, the efficient breach argument against punitive
damages is mistaken because breach is not the only alternative to inefficient performance. The promisor facing the prospect of inefficient
performance may approach the promisee and seek a release from her
contractual obligations.206
Proponents of the efficient breach argument have not completely ignored the possibility of seeking a release. For example, in
the context of discussing specific performance (another form of
property-rule protection), Judge Posner notes that “[t]he results of
decreeing specific performance are not catastrophic, since the seller
can always pay the buyer to surrender the right of specific performance and presumably will do so if a substitute transfer would yield a
higher price.”207 The same goes for punitive damages: a promisor who
wants to avoid them can always pay the promisee for a release. However, Judge Posner argues, “the additional negotiation will not be
costless.”208 Indeed, the potential transaction costs of the additional
negotiation are quite high because there is a “bilateral monopoly”209—neither party has an alternative to dealing with the other and
each may act strategically to obtain a larger share of the gain from
the second transaction.210 What Judge Posner tends to ignore are the

204. See, e.g., id. at 1656-67; Farber, supra note 14, at 1448-55; Curtis, supra note 14, at 16870.
205. See, e.g., Putz & Klippen, supra note 53, at 481-98 (arguing that awarding attorneys’
fees is preferable to awarding punitive damages); Barrett, supra note 53, at 527-28 (same);
Chutorian, supra note 53, at 403-06 (arguing that requirements of foreseeability and certainty
be relaxed for bad faith breaches); Scallen, supra note 53, at 1189-96 (same).
206. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L.
REV. 947, 950-53 (1982) (noting that breach is only one of the ways to avoid performance of an
inefficient contract).
207. POSNER, supra note 4, at 146.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. For further discussion of bilateral monopoly and strategic behavior, see infra Part
II.C.2.b.i-ii.
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costs of litigation211 and the fact that the same problems of bilateral
monopoly and strategic behavior also arise in litigation. To evaluate
the claim that allowing a party to breach and pay damages is more efficient than encouraging negotiations with the threat of punitive
damages (or specific performance), one must compare the costs of
such negotiations with the costs of assessing damages.
2. The Analytic Framework.
a. Property rules, liability rules, and contract remedies. In One View
of the Cathedral, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed identified
two ways of protecting a legal entitlement: “property rules” and
“liability rules.” “An entitlement is protected by a property rule to
the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from
its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which
the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”212 An entitlement is protected by a liability rule if someone may remove it
without the entitlement holder’s consent and pay an amount determined by a court.213 Thus, in a nuisance context, a neighborhood’s entitlement to clean air is protected by a property rule if the neighborhood may enjoin a factory from polluting; it is protected by a liability
rule if the factory may pollute and pay damages.214 Both property
rules and liability rules allow entitlements to change hands. The factory liable for damages may deprive the neighborhood of clean air if
it pays those damages, while the factory subject to an injunction may
negotiate with the neighborhood to be released from the injunction.
Property rules and liability rules differ fundamentally, however, with
respect to how the “price” of the entitlement is set. Under a property
rule, the parties determine the price through bargaining; under a liability rule, a court determines the price.

211. While explaining that expectation damages are efficient because they encourage efficient breach, Judge Posner does note that assignment of contractual rights from one buyer to
another, rather than having the seller breach and pay damages, avoids litigation costs. See
POSNER supra note 4, at 133. But generally he assumes that litigation is costless while negotiations are expensive.
212. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1092.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1115-16.
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Although Calabresi and Melamed wrote primarily about property and tort remedies, contract remedies may also be divided into
property rules and liability rules.215 As one commentator explained:
The ordinary remedy of expectation damages resembles a liability
rule, for it allows one party to break the contract whenever she is
willing to pay the court’s estimate of the value of her performance to
the other party. By contrast, the remedy of specific performance
protects the promisee with a property rule, barring the promisor
from breaking the contract unless she negotiates her release from
216
the promisee.

Liquidated damages clauses that operate as penalties and punitive
damages also protect the promisee with a property rule because they
make breaching the contract prohibitively expensive.217 A promisor
who wishes to avoid performance has to negotiate with the promisee
for a release from her contractual obligations.218 One can see immediately that American contract law displays an overwhelming preference for liability rules.219 The usual remedy for breach of contract is
expectation damages. Specific performance is awarded only in limited situations when expectation damages would be inadequate,220
liquidated damages clauses are not permitted if they operate as pen-

215. Tony Kronman was the first to recognize this. See Kronman, supra note 15, at 352.
216. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993); see also Kronman, supra note 15, at 352.
217. See Craswell, supra note 216, at 4 (classifying penalty clauses and punitive damages as
property rules); Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 15, at 724 (“[A] liability rule
with very high damages is equivalent to property rule protection of victims.”); Ayres & Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1041 (“[I]f the damages are greater than . . . the highest valuation of any potential defendant . . . then the plaintiff’s entitlement is ‘property-like’ in
nature.”).
Restitution generally does not operate as a property rule, even though it may exceed expectation damages. Because the breaching party may sometimes escape liability, requiring restitution is not sufficient to deter breach. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
218. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1041 (“With such relatively high damages, potential takers would be deterred from nonconsensual takings, and the
entitlement would be transferred only by consensual agreement.”).
219. Civil law systems, by contrast, tend to protect contractual entitlements with property
rules. They generally allow the promisee to choose specific performance and to enforce penalty
clauses. See RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES—TEXT—
MATERIALS 663-84 (5th ed. 1988); Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 434-38, 441 (1995).
220. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 359(1). But see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH
OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 37-48 (1991) (arguing that courts routinely find that damages are inadequate when the plaintiff prefers specific performance).
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alties,221 and punitive damages are generally banned.222 Is this preference for liability rules justified?
Calabresi and Melamed suggested that liability rules might be
appropriate when the transaction costs of voluntary negotiations are
high.223 For example, in a nuisance context with multiple entitlement
holders, one might prefer a liability rule because holdout problems
would make voluntary negotiations impractical.224 When transaction
costs are low, on the other hand, it has generally been assumed that
property rules are preferable because the parties are in a better position than a court to determine the value of an entitlement. James
Krier and Stewart Schwab note that later commentators have converted Calabresi and Melamed’s observations into a familiar piece of
conventional wisdom: “When transaction costs are low, use property
rules; when transaction costs are high, use liability rules.”225 This is
not what Calabresi and Melamed actually wrote, though. Rather,
they called for a comparison of the costs of negotiation (market
valuation) with the costs of valuation by a court (collective valuation): “[A] very common reason, perhaps the most common one, for
employing a liability rule rather than a property rule to protect an entitlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is either unavailable or too expensive compared to a
collective valuation.”226 Thus, as Krier and Schwab have recently reemphasized, liability rules are appropriate not where the transaction
costs of voluntary negotiations are high in absolute terms, but where
they are high relative to the costs of having a court determine the
correct level of damages (what they call “assessment costs”).227
To determine whether contract law’s preference for liability
rules in general, and its aversion to punitive damages in particular, is
justified, the transaction costs of negotiating a release from a contractual obligation must be compared with the assessment costs of de221. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 356.
222. See id. § 355; see also supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
223. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1106-08.
224. See id. at 1119.
225. Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 451. Krier and Schwab have challenged the conventional wisdom that liability rules are better when transaction costs are high. See id. at 452. On
the other hand, two other recent articles have challenged the conventional wisdom that property rules are better when transaction costs are low. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining,
supra note 15; Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 15. For discussion of these arguments and their implications for contract remedies, see infra Part II.C.2.b.iii.
226. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1110 (emphasis added).
227. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 453-57.
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termining damages where the promisor deliberately decides to
breach.228
b. Transaction costs and assessment costs. Judge Posner generally
argues in favor of protecting contractual entitlements with a liability
rule (expectation damages) and against protecting such entitlements
with property rules (like specific performance) on the ground that
property-rule protection requires an additional transaction to achieve
efficiency.229 If a widget manufacturer is required to negotiate a
release from A before selling to B, two transactions are required; if
she may breach and pay damages there is only one transaction,
between the manufacturer and B. As Daniel Friedmann points out,
though, whether property-rule protection requires more transactions
than liability-rule protection depends on which transactions one
counts.230 If one recognizes that the dispute between the manufacturer
and A over A’s damages is a transaction, then requiring the seller to
negotiate a release from A before selling to B does not increase the
total number of transactions.231
The real issue, then, is not the total number of transactions but
the transaction costs associated with negotiation as compared to the
assessment costs associated with litigation.232 Negotiations potentially
give rise to many forms of transaction costs.233 In some contexts, there

228. Of course if there were no transaction costs, then under the Coase Theorem it would
not matter whether contractual entitlement were protected by a property rule or a liability rule
since the parties could bargain around either rule to reach an efficient result. See generally
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
229. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 133 (noting that expectation damages avoid additional
transaction); id. at 146 (noting that specific performance requires an additional transaction).
But see id. at 142-45 (advocating enforcement of in terrorem liquidated damages clauses); id. at
130 (arguing that courts should “throw the book” at opportunistic breachers).
230. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-7 (1989).
231. See id. In fact, the property might end up in B’s hands with only one more transaction
if the seller performs and A then sells the property to B. See id. at 6. This assumes, however,
that A will be able to discover B’s identity, which is not necessarily realistic.
232. For the sake of simplicity, I will treat litigation and pre-breach negotiation as the parties’ only alternatives. Of course, I realize that the parties may negotiate a settlement following
the breach in order to avoid litigation. As Ian Macneil has noted, however, “‘talking after a
breach’ may be one of the more expensive forms of conversation to be found, involving, as it so
often does, engaging high-priced lawyers, and gambits like starting litigation, engaging in discovery, and even trying and appealing cases.” Macneil, supra note 206, at 968-69. Because postbreach negotiations involve many of the same costs as litigation, it does not seem necessary to
consider post-breach negotiations as a separate alternative.
233. For a useful typology, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 84-86.
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are the costs of identifying the party with whom to negotiate.234 Then
there are the basic costs of bargaining—communicating with the
other party, spending the time necessary to reach an agreement, and
perhaps reducing that agreement to writing. In situations involving
multiple parties, there are additional bargaining costs created by
holdout and free rider problems.235 In situations involving only two
parties, there are additional bargaining costs because of strategic behavior: the parties are trapped in a “bilateral monopoly,” in which
neither has an alternative to dealing with the other, and each tries to
obtain as much from the other party as possible.236
Litigation also involves a kind of transaction costs, which Krier
and Schwab call “assessment costs.”237 These costs can be broken
down into two basic categories: valuation costs and error costs.238
Valuation costs include the costs to the parties and to the court of obtaining and processing the information necessary to determine damages. Error costs are simply the costs of a court being wrong. For example, a court might award the nonbreaching party an amount less
than his actual losses.239
i. Transaction costs: bilateral monopoly and strategic behavior. Negotiating a release from contractual obligations generally does not
involve either identification costs or holdout/free rider problems.240
There are only two parties, and these parties not only know each
other, but have also bargained successfully in the past.241 Rather, the
problem of bilateral monopoly and the possibility of strategic behavior present the biggest barriers to successful negotiation.242

234. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1108-09 (pointing to these costs as justifying a liability rule in the case of automobile accidents).
235. See id. at 1119 (pointing to these problems as justifying a liability rule in pollution nuisance cases).
236. This problem is sometimes also characterized as a problem of private or asymmetric
information. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1035.
237. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 459.
238. See id.; see also POSNER, supra note 4, at 599 (“The objective of a procedural system,
viewed economically, is to minimize the sum of [error costs and administrative costs].”).
239. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1108 (identifying incorrect valuations as a
problem with liability rules).
240. See Kronman, supra note 15, at 353.
241. See Ulen, supra note 18, at 369.
242. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1029-30; Ulen, supra note
18, at 381-82. For a good theoretical discussion of strategic behavior in bargaining, see Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20-24 (1982).
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Before considering how strategic behavior might hinder a mutually beneficial exchange, it is important to recognize how the possibility of a mutually beneficial exchange comes about. To return to the
example of the widget manufacturer, assume that this manufacturer
has agreed to supply A with 1,000 widgets for $1 each. A’s intended
use of these widgets will earn A a profit of $250. Now assume that B
offers the manufacturer $1,500 for the same widgets but that the
manufacturer may not sell the widgets to B unless A agrees to release
her from the first contract. One can see that there is a range of possible prices for the release that will benefit both the manufacturer and
A. The manufacturer will be better off even if she has to pay $499 for
the release; A will be better off even if he is paid only $251 for the
release. Indeed, at any price between $250 (A’s expected profit under
the first contract) and $500 (the manufacturer’s expected profit from
being able to get out of the first contract), both parties will be better
off.243
However, each party has an incentive to behave strategically in
order to obtain as much of the surplus as possible. The party who
wants a release is likely to understate its true value to her, while the
party from whom the release is sought is likely to overstate the value
of performance to him. “[E]ach party may be so determined to engross the greater part of the potential profits from the transaction
that they never succeed in coming to terms.”244 On the other hand, the

243. The example in the text assumes that what B offers for the widgets is greater than the
market price. If the market price for 1000 widgets were $1,500, then A’s expected profit under
the first contract would be $500, which is what A would gain from reselling the widgets on the
market, and there would be no deal with the manufacturer that would make A better off.
244. POSNER, supra note 4, at 68-69; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 132, at 85-86
(“In forming a bargaining strategy, each party tries to anticipate how much the opponent will
concede. If the parties miscalculate the other party’s resolve, each will be surprised to find that
the other does not concede, and as a result, negotiations may fail.”); Polinsky, supra note 15, at
1092 (“In order to acquire more of the gains from trade, or to establish reputations as tough
bargainers, parties adopt ‘hold out’ tactics. If both parties are stubborn, they may never reach
an agreement.”); Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1030:
[S]elf-interested bargainers have a strong incentive to misrepresent their private
valuations so as to capture a larger share of the bargaining “pie.” . . . Sellers tend to
overstate the value they place on the bargained-for item, while buyers tend to understate their desire to purchase it. As a result of such strategic behavior, the parties
may fail to detect and exploit a mutually beneficial trade, and even when they can it
is usually after considerable and costly delay.
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parties have a strong incentive to reach an agreement, since doing so
would make both of them better off.245
Experimental tests conducted by Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer suggest that strategic behavior does not in fact prevent
parties from reaching efficient results in two-party bargaining situations analogous to negotiating a release from a contract.246 Hoffman
and Spitzer ran a series of tests with college students to see if they
would bargain to Pareto-optimal solutions. One series of tests involved two parties and limited information: each subject was told
what her own payoff would be from a particular choice but not what
the other party’s payoff would be.247 Moreover, one of the parties was
given the power to choose the outcome unilaterally, which is analogous to protecting that party with a property rule.248 In twenty experiments, nineteen of the pairs bargained to the Pareto-optimal
choice.249 Hoffman and Spitzer confirmed these results in later experiments.250 In thirty-eight experiments, thirty-six of the pairs bargained to the Pareto-optimal solution.251 These experiments justify an
assumption that strategic behavior generally will not prevent mutually beneficial exchanges and “that the parties can and will exhaust
the gains from trade by voluntary agreement.”252
It is generally agreed that strategic behavior will not prevent parties from coming to terms.253 Advocates for liability rules still worry,
245. As Robert Cooter points out, “the optimal strategy is found by trading off a higher
payoff in the event of settlement against a lower probability of settlement.” Cooter, supra note
242, at 21.
246. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982) [hereinafter Hoffman & Spitzer, Small Bargaining
Groups]; Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem
with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986) [hereinafter Hoffman & Spitzer,
Large Bargaining Groups].
247. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Small Bargaining Groups, supra note 246, at 86-87.
248. See id. at 84.
249. See id. at 92 tbl.2.
250. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Large Bargaining Groups, supra note 246, at 154. In the second set of experiments they decided which of the parties would have the power to make the
choice unilaterally not by the toss of a coin, as they had in the first set of experiments, but
based on who won a simple game. The idea was to create a sense of moral justification for the
property right protection and to reduce the chances that the party protected by a property right
would behave altruistically. See id.
251. See id. at 158 tbl.3.
252. Id. at 151.
253. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 69 (“Although the frustration of a potentially valuemaximizing exchange is the most dramatic consequence of bilateral monopoly, it is not the
usual consequence. Usually the parties will bargain to a mutually satisfactory price.”); Ulen,
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though, that strategic behavior will make negotiations costly.254 For
the sake of argument, one may concede that, although bilateral monopoly and strategic behavior do not prevent efficient exchanges,
they increase the costs of those exchanges.255 One must still weigh
these transaction costs, however, against the assessment costs of litigation. As I demonstrate, those assessment costs are likely to be
higher because litigation is subject to the same sort of strategic behavior, which increases valuation costs, as well as subject to additional valuation costs and error costs that are not present with voluntary negotiations.
ii. Assessment costs: strategic behavior, litigation costs, and error
costs. Just as negotiations involve transaction costs, so litigation
involves assessment costs. Assessment costs include both valuation
costs, the costs to the parties and to the court of obtaining and
processing the information necessary to determine damages, and
error costs, the costs of the court being wrong.256 In considering
assessment costs, it is important to recognize that litigation over
damages, like negotiations for a release, occur in a situation of
bilateral monopoly. There are just two parties, and neither has an
alternative to dealing with the other. It should not be surprising,
therefore, to see that litigation over damages is also susceptible to
strategic behavior.257 A party from whom a release is sought may
overstate the value to him of performance as easily in litigation as he
may in negotiation. “Judges will have problems assessing the correct
values for the same reason private bargainers would: limited, hidden

supra note 18, at 382 n.133 (“The economic literature stresses . . . indeterminacy of price and
quantity in bilateral monopoly. Nowhere does that literature suggest that an exchange will not
take place between the monopolists.”); Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1092 n.37 (“In a two party
bargaining situation . . . strategic behavior is probably more likely to result in delay and extra
expense than in a permanent failure to reach an agreement.”); see also RONALD H. COASE,
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 161-62 (1988) (observing that breakdowns in bargaining because of strategic behavior are rare).
254. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 69 (“Bilateral monopoly is a social problem, because the
transaction costs incurred by each party in an effort to engross as much of the profit of the
transaction as possible are a social waste.”); Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note
15, at 1030.
255. Hoffman and Spitzer did not attempt to measure the transaction costs of negotiating a
Pareto-optimal solution. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
257. See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1079 (“[D]amage remedies are just as susceptible to
strategic behavior problems as injunctive remedies when, realistically, courts cannot correctly
determine actual damages.”).
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information. If parties can hide their valuations from each other, they
can hide them from a judge.”258
In the context of litigation, the costs of strategic behavior are
mitigated to some extent by two factors. First, in litigation only one
of the parties—the nonbreaching party—has an opportunity to act
strategically because only the nonbreaching party’s valuation (his actual loss) is relevant in determining damages. The breaching party
has no opportunity to act strategically because how much she valued
being able to escape the contract has no bearing on the question of
damages. In pre-breach negotiations for a release, by contrast, each
party has an opportunity to act strategically: the promisor by understating the value of a release to her; the promisee by overstating the
value of performance to him. Second, in litigation, the availability of
discovery limits the nonbreaching party’s ability to overstate his
damages to a certain extent.
But discovery does not make the problem of strategic behavior
in litigation disappear. The nonbreaching party may not have documents to be discovered that would contradict his perhaps overstated
claims of loss. Even if he does, discovery is not cheap and obtaining
the information to prevent the nonbreaching party from acting strategically may be prohibitively expensive.259 Finally, in some cases, the
value of performance to the nonbreaching party will be highly idiosyncratic, and the nonbreaching party’s assertion that performance
was worth a great deal to him simply cannot be contradicted.260 Thus,
strategic behavior will often create significant assessment costs in litigation, even though those costs will tend to be somewhat lower than
the transaction costs created by strategic behavior in negotiations for
a release.
Whatever advantages litigation may offer over negotiation with
respect to strategic behavior, there are enough additional assessment
costs in litigation to outweigh these advantages. First, there are the
costs to the parties of conducting the litigation. These are analogous
to the costs to the parties of conducting a negotiation,261 but are likely
to be much higher, for while the parties may conduct negotiations for
a release by themselves, they must retain lawyers in order to litigate.
258. Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 462.
259. These costs are simply further examples of the litigation costs summarized infra at 261263 and accompanying text.
260. In cases of idiosyncratic value, error costs are also increased. See infra text following
note 263.
261. See supra text following note 234.
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Second, there are the costs of informing the court about the contract, the industry, and the parties’ valuations,262 costs that are borne
in part by the parties in the form of more attorney time and in part by
the publicly subsidized court system.263 These costs do not arise in negotiations because the parties already know the relevant information.
Finally, litigation over damages raises the possibility of error
costs. A court might award the nonbreaching party less than its actual
damages or it might award the nonbreaching party an amount greater
than the gain that the breaching party obtained from the breach. In
either case, one party is worse off than if the contract had been performed—an inefficient result. Voluntary negotiations, on the other
hand, do not impose error costs. The party from whom a release is
sought will not accept less than his actual damages and the party who
seeks a release will not agree to pay more than she would gain from
the release.
If the transaction costs of negotiation are compared with the assessment costs of litigation, it becomes clear that negotiation tends to
be cheaper. Strategic behavior increases the costs of either option, although it may contribute more to the transactions costs of negotiation than it does to the assessment costs of litigation. Litigation, however, is accompanied by additional costs that tend to make it more
expensive than negotiation: (1) the cost of hiring lawyers; (2) the cost
of informing the court; and (3) the error costs of misdetermining
damages.264 These additional costs associated with litigation suggest
that protecting contractual entitlements with a liability rule like expectation damages is not as efficient as protecting them with a property rule like punitive damages.265 The threat of punitive damages for
willfully breaching a contract will force the party who wants to get
262. See Ulen, supra note 18, at 368-69.
263. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 631 (noting that “the taxpayer also bears some of [the
parties’ litigation costs]”).
264. Indeed it is in order to avoid at least some of these costs that the parties to a contractual dispute frequently settle before trial. For discussion of the effects of punitive damages on
the likelihood of settlement, see infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
265. This would be true even if the liability rule were “fixed” by awarding attorneys’ fees so
that expectation damages would come closer to putting the nonbreaching party in the same position as if the contract had been performed, as several authors have suggested. See, e.g., Putz &
Klippen, supra note 53, at 481-98; Barrett, supra note 53, at 527-28. In other words, the assessment costs of determining damages would not change even if contract damages were made
more fully compensatory. Because, as I have argued, these assessment costs will tend to be
larger than the transaction costs of the parties negotiating a release from the contract, it is more
efficient to protect contractual entitlements with a property rule that discourages willful
breaches altogether.
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out of the contract to negotiate a release from the other party, which
will tend to be cheaper than litigating the amount of damages.266
iii. Other arguments for a liability rule. Two recent articles argue that
entitlements should generally be protected with liability rules, even
when transaction costs are low.267 Ian Ayres and Eric Talley argue
that protecting entitlements with a liability rule “can reduce the
incentive to behave strategically during bargaining, thereby
enhancing economic efficiency.”268 Ayres and Talley, however, have a
specific kind of liability rule in mind: an “untailored liability rule[]”
that requires the breaching party to pay a set amount of damages
regardless of whether the nonbreaching party can demonstrate actual
loss.269 If the untailored damages amount is common knowledge,
which the authors concede is not the case in many litigation
contexts,270 then the promisee will be forced to reveal whether he
values performance more than the damage amount because only a
promisee who values performance more than this amount would be
willing to negotiate with the promisor and attempt to pay the
promisor not to breach.271 While an untailored liability rule forces the
promisee to reveal a limited amount of information, however, it
actually “exacerbate[s] [the promisor’s] incentive to misrepresent

266. Richard Craswell has argued that one must also consider what effect the choice of contract remedies will have on what he calls “precaution” and “selection” decisions—i.e., how
much to spend on precautions to prevent a breach and how risky a partner with which to contract. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 646-56. He argues that supracompensatory damages may
distort these decisions, leading promisors to spend inefficiently large amounts to avoid the possibility of breach and disfavoring risky sellers, who must charge a higher price to insure against
the possibility of extracompensatory damages. See id. However, if punitive damages are limited
to willful breaches, as I suggest, neither of these distortions will occur. A promisor who fails to
take extra precautions against breaching would not by virtue of that fact alone be deemed to
have willfully breached the contract. Similarly, a risky seller would not be liable for punitive
damages unless she willfully breached the contract. Since that factor is within her control, she
would not have to charge more to insure against it. Craswell’s arguments against supracompensatory damages are better directed at liquidated damages clauses, which operate without regard
to the reasons for breach. See infra notes 304-09 and accompanying text (discussing liquidated
damages).
267. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1032-33; Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 15, at 716-18.
268. Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 15, at 1030.
269. Id. at 1032 n.13.
270. See id. at 1046 n.60.
271. See id. at 1044-45. Tailoring the damages to reflect the promisee’s actual loss undermines this dynamic because it “gives the [promisee] a form of ‘perfect insurance’ against bargaining breakdown.” Id. at 1066.
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valuation.”272 As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have pointed out,
Ayres and Talley “do not explain why this countervailing factor is not
controlling.”273 Ultimately, Ayres and Talley’s creative argument
offers little of practical value in choosing contract remedies. Its
requirement that the damage amount not attempt to reflect the
nonbreaching party’s actual losses is contrary to the conventional
understanding of expectation damages and introduces enormous
error costs in the perhaps unfounded hope of reducing strategic
behavior.274
In another recent article, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue for liability rules not as a way of facilitating bargaining but as a
way of reducing the costs when bargaining fails.275 Essentially, they
argue that “before any bargaining occurs, at the beginning of the
‘race’ between the two types of rule[s], the liability rule is ahead of
272. Id. at 1047.
273. Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra note 15, at 227.
274. Even more recently, Ayres and another coauthor, J.M. Balkin, have proposed protecting entitlements through an internal auction, in which the parties are allowed to take and
retake entitlements at continually higher prices, in order to mitigate strategic behavior. See
Ayres & Balkin, supra note 15, at 707-17. Applying this notion to the remedy for breach of contract, Ayres and Balkin suggest that “[a]fter a promisor signaled her intention to breach, the
promisee might be given the option to purchase ‘specific performance’ by paying an amount
above and beyond the initial contract price.” Id. at 745. “The [promisor] could either accept
this amount and perform, or breach the contract and pay ordinary damages plus the additional
amount that the [promisee] offered to pay.” Id. at 746. The beauty of this solution is that it mitigates the promisee’s incentive to act strategically. The promisee will not offer to pay more unless he really believes that performance is worth more than expectation damages because he
does not know, when he makes the offer, whether he will have to pay the additional amount
(which would happen if the promisor accepts the offer) or whether he will receive the additional amount in addition to his damages (which would happen if the promisor rejects the offer
and breaches). See id. at 746-47.
However, Ayres and Balkin’s thoughtful solution will not work either because, while it
mitigates the promisee’s incentive to act strategically, it allows the promisor to act opportunistically. First, and most obviously, Ayres and Balkin’s proposal works only if the promisor gives
the promisee advance notice of her intention to breach. The promisor could defeat their
scheme and avoid the possibility of having to pay more than regular expectation damages by
breaching without notice, giving the promisee no opportunity to purchase performance by offering an additional amount. Second, Ayres and Balkin’s proposal allows the promisor to act
opportunistically to extort more than the contract price from the promisee. A promisor who has
no intention to breach might nevertheless threaten to do so in the expectation that the promisee will offer her more than the contract price to perform, since expectation damages typically
fall short of the promisee’s actual losses. This possibility for opportunistic behavior by the
promisor already exists with expectation damages, but Ayres and Balkin’s proposal would do
nothing to alleviate it and would, in a sense, institutionalize it.
275. See Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 15, at 734-37. Kaplow and Shavell
focus on property rights and do not specifically consider contract remedies, although they suggest that their analysis “may have some bearing on contract law.” Id. at 716 n.1.
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the property rules.”276 This is because only liability rules can result in
efficiency in the absence of bargaining.277 Kaplow and Shavell argue
that if one assumes bargaining is possible but will not always be successful,278 then liability rules are still more efficient:
Because an efficient outcome is more likely under the liability rule,
bargaining need not take place as often, so the prospect that bargaining will fail is irrelevant in a greater range of cases. And because
the extent of the initial inefficiency tends to be less under the liability rule, the failure of bargaining will be less serious when it does oc279
cur.

This argument depends critically, however, on the assumption that
litigation is inexpensive or at least is no more expensive under a liability rule than under a property rule.280 Specifically, Kaplow and
Shavell assume that litigation must occur under either a property rule
or a liability rule: under a liability rule to set the amount of damages
and under a property rule to determine which party holds the entitlement.281 Here, the authors’ focus on nuisance cases becomes apparent. In the case of a polluting factory, litigation is necessary to determine whether the pollution is a nuisance even under a property rule.
The same is not true in contracts. Litigation generally is not necessary
to determine who holds the entitlement because the contract itself establishes that the promisee does. Once one recognizes that in contract law liability rules impose greater assessment costs than property
rules, the liability rule’s supposed “head start” disappears.282

276. Id. at 735.
277. See id. at 724-28.
278. If bargaining is always successful, then property rules and liability rules are equally
efficient. See id. at 733-34. This is simply an application of the Coase Theorem. See Coase, supra note 228, at 2-8.
279. Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 15, at 736.
280. See id. at 741-42.
281. See id.
282. See Ayres & Talley, Distinguishing, supra note 15, at 245 (“Adding litigation costs . . .
eliminates the nonconsensual advantage of liability rules.”). Ayres and Talley argue that liability rules are even more effective in forcing information from entitlement owners once one considers litigation costs because they give entitlement owners with an intermediate valuation an
additional motivation to sell in order to avoid these costs. See id. at 247-50. However, Ayres’s
and Talley’s argument for the efficiency of liability rules in the presence of litigation costs is
still subject to the substantial qualifications noted above: (1) that the liability rule must be
“untailored” in that it makes no attempt to compensate the entitlement owner for his actual
loss; (2) that the untailored damage amount be known to both parties; and (3) that the nonowner’s incentive to misrepresent her valuation, which an untailored liability rule exacerbates,
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c. Punitive damages as the default rule. Adopting punitive damages
for willful breach of contract as the default rule for willful breach of
contract would not preclude parties from contracting around that
rule. Some parties would likely choose to include a provision barring
punitive damages for breach283 or, more directly, a provision giving
the promisor the option not to perform upon payment of the
promisee’s expectation damages or a fixed sum. In other words, the
promisor could always buy the right to breach.
This suggests, however, that making punitive damages available
for willful breach might increase the costs of contract formation by
requiring parties to contract around such a default rule. This argument might carry some weight if one could show that contracting parties are equally content with performance or damages, as Holmes
suggested they are.284 It is not at all clear, though, that Holmes was
right. As Karl Llewellyn wrote in one of the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code: “[T]he essential purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to win a
lawsuit.”285 Even Holmes admitted that “when people make contracts,
they usually contemplate the performance rather than the breach.”286
For example, empirical studies suggest that merchants want to be

does not overwhelm the advantages of forcing some information from the entitlement owner.
See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
283. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1995) (allowing the parties to limit liability for consequential
damages unless unconscionable); Ulen, supra note 18, at 377-79 (predicting that if specific performance were routinely available some parties would use boilerplate provisions to stipulate
money damages).
284. See HOLMES, supra note 2, at 301 (“The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not
come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfilment has
gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing
else.”).
285. U.C.C. § 2-609, cmt. 1 (1995); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 437 (1930) (“It is a heresy when Coke or Holmes
speaks of a man having liberty under the law to perform his contract, or pay damages, at his
option.”). Daniel Friedmann has suggested that the tort of interference with contractual relations also shows that performance, not damages, is the background assumption in contract law.
See Friedmann, supra note 230, at 20 (“There is . . . a marked incongruity between the ‘right’ to
break a contract theory and the tort of interference with contractual relations: why should a
person be liable for inducing another to exercise his right?”).
286. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 302.
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able to insist on performance even if in practice they frequently
modify a contract to accommodate the other party.287
Even if it could be shown that most contracting parties prefer
not to have punitive damages be available for willful breach, making
those damages available and allowing the parties to contract out of
them would still be preferable to the current state of the law because
it would accommodate those parties who do prefer performance.
Current law does not permit the parties to contract into property-rule
protection. They cannot specify that their contract will be specifically
enforceable or that the breacher will be subject to punitive damages.
Neither can they include an in terrorem liquidated damages clause to
compel performance.288 Unless they can show that they have no adequate remedy at law and are therefore entitled to specific performance, they must be content with expectation damages. Giving parties
the option of property-rule protection (whether through specific performance, in terrorem liquidated damages, or punitive damages for
willful breach289) will tend to increase the welfare of contracting parties on the whole by giving them the option of compelling performance. Parties who prefer liability-rule protection could make that
choice in their contract.
d. Distributional differences. I have argued above that requiring the
promisor to negotiate for a release by allowing punitive damages for
willful breach (property-rule protection) is more efficient than
allowing the promisor to breach and pay damages (liability-rule
protection). But it is important to note that protecting contractual
entitlements with a property rule will also have significant
distributional effects.
Consider, once again, the example of the widget manufacturer
who has agreed to supply A with 1,000 widgets for $1 each, which A
will use to earn a profit of $250. With a liability rule of expectation
damages, if B now offers $1,500 for the same widgets, the manufacturer is free to breach the contract with A, pay A $250 in expectation

287. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1801-02 (1996) (discussing merchants’
opposition to abandonment of the perfect tender rule).
288. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 356(2) (forbidding the use of liquidated damages
clauses that operate as penalties).
289. For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of these various forms of
property-rule protection, see infra Part II.C.2.e.
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damages,290 and pocket all of the gains from the second transactioni.e., all of the remaining $250. With a property rule of punitive
damages for willful breach, on the other hand, the widget manufacturer will have to negotiate a release from A before selling to B, and
A will no doubt insist that the manufacturer share some, or even
most, of the gains from the second transaction as the price of obtaining the release. A’s insistence on sharing the seller’s gains from the
second transaction is sometimes characterized as “extortion.”291
A’s insistence on sharing the seller’s gains can only be considered extortion, though, if the manufacturer is somehow entitled to
keep all of these gains.292 Expectation damages give all of the gains to
the breacher. As Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have asked: “Why
should this end result be regarded as any ‘fairer’ than one which splits
the gains fifty-fifty or gives them all to the non-breacher?”293 Indeed,
a strong argument can be made that the widgets, once promised to A,
belong to A and that most of the gain from selling the widgets to B
rightfully belongs to A too. If the widgets had actually been delivered
to A, the manufacturer could not retake them and sell them to B,
even if she were willing to make A whole. Does delivery make such a
difference in the equities that A is entitled to all of the gains from a
second transaction after delivery but to none of the gains before delivery?294
Richard Craswell argues that the distributional effects of contract remedies are not quite so simple:

290. This assumes that the market price of the widgets has not risen above $1,250. Otherwise, A’s expectation damages would be greater than $250, specifically the difference between
the contract price and the market price. See supra note 243.
291. See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1077-78 (noting the existence of the “extortion” argument against property rules); Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 465-67 (same).
292. See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1110 (“Neither party is ‘entitled’ to these gains in the
first place; rather, the desirability of those transfers depends on the distributional goal society
wishes to promote.”); Krier & Schwab, supra note 15, at 466-67 (“[N]either party is, prima facie, entitled [to the gains from trade]. . . . In order to assure that R doesn’t extort something
from P, the court extorts everything from R!”).
293. Goetz & Scott, supra note 18, at 568.
294. Richard Epstein makes the same point with the example of a house:
If A and B agree to the sale of A’s house to B for $100,000, then B should normally
get the house and not just a damage remedy. A damage remedy looks as though it
were a unilateral revision of the original deal. If B collects $10,000 in damages, it is
as though the house were first sold for $100,000 and then, against B’s will, retaken by
A for $110,000.
Epstein, supra note 15, at 2098.

DODGE TO PRINTER.DOC

682

04/29/99 4:24 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[48:629

If the legal rule allows the seller to keep most of the gains in those
cases where a better offer is later received, the seller will be able to
quote a lower price than that which could be quoted under a rule
allowing buyers to capture most of those gains. . . . [T]he availability
of punitive remedies does not really ‘give’ buyers the right to more
295
of the profits. Instead, it ‘sells’ that right to them.”

Assuming, however, that punitive damages were available for willful
breach of contract, buyers who preferred a lower price in exchange
for relinquishing punitive damages would be free to make that deal.296
Today, with punitive damages and other forms of property-rule protection barred, buyers who prefer to pay a higher price in order to be
assured of performance are not able to exercise that preference. In
short, while punitive damages may indeed “sell” a buyer the right to
share the gains from a second transaction, the prohibition on punitive
damages prevents them from “buying” that right even if they wish to
do so.
Ultimately, however, the efficiency of punitive damages for willful breach of contract does not turn on whom one thinks should get
the gains from a second transaction. Pareto efficiency is served so
long as the rule chosen allows goods and services to flow to the people who value them most, increasing society’s total welfare; it does
not matter how those gains in welfare are distributed so long as no
party is left worse off than before.297 Thus, even if one believes that a
breaching party should be allowed to keep all of the gains from a sec-

295. Craswell, supra note 15, at 642. Alan Schwartz takes this argument one step further,
arguing that a rational promisee would never want punitive damages if she had to pay extra for
them. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An
Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 390 (1990). My point is not
that a rational promisee should prefer a chance at collecting punitive damages but that she
should prefer that the promisor negotiate with her for a release if the promisor wishes not to
perform because this is a cheaper way of establishing the value of the contractual entitlement
than litigation. Moreover, if the parties truly do not prefer supracompensatory remedies, they
can always contract around them.
296. See supra text accompanying note 283.
297. See Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1077-78 (noting that “the extortion argument relates to
the goal of distributional equity, not economic efficiency”); Kronman, supra note 15, 353 n.12
(stating that under a property rule “the only difference is a distributional one”); Ulen, supra
note 18, at 383 (stating that “the distribution of this surplus between A and B is not at issue in
an efficiency analysis”); Goetz & Scott, supra note 18, at 559:
In order to maintain the efficiency value of the rule, however, it is only necessary
that some minimal amount of benefits are retained by the breacher in order to induce him not to perform. The allocation of the gains from breach is, therefore,
largely a question of wealth transfer between the contracting parties.
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ond transaction, one must consider whether this distributional goal is
worth the loss in efficiency.
e. Comparing punitive damages with specific performance and
liquidated damages. As I noted above, punitive damages are not the
only way to protect contractual entitlements with a property rule.298
Specific performance and liquidated damages clauses that operate as
penalties also operate as contractual property rules. Specific
performance and liquidated damages each have advantages that
punitive damages lack, which may explain why law and economics
scholars who argue in favor of specific performance299 and liquidated
damages300 on efficiency grounds have generally failed to extend the
same analysis to punitive damages. Specific performance and
liquidated damages also have substantial limitations, though, which
suggest that if contractual entitlements are to be protected by a
property rule to encourage negotiation and increase efficiency,
punitive damages must be available for willful breach of contract.
Specific performance has the advantage of placing the nonbreaching party in the same position as if the contract had not been
broken.301 It does not leave the nonbreaching party in a better position
than performance or leave the breaching party in a worse position
than performance, as punitive damages may. Sometimes, however,
298. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Ulen, supra note 18; Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—
Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981); Alan
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). But see POSNER, supra
note 4, at 145-47 (arguing that specific performance is less efficient because it requires negotiations for a release); Kronman, supra note 15 (arguing that traditional limitations on specific
performance are efficient); Timothy J. Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1053, 1061-68 (arguing that specific performance is inefficient, assuming
damages are easily calculable, because it requires negotiations for a release); Edward Yorio, In
Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982) (arguing
for money damages on economic, noneconomic, and flexibility grounds).
300. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 142-45; Goetz & Scott, supra note 18; Mattei, supra
note 219; Phillip R. Kaplan, Note, A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages,
50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1977). But see Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v.
Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351 (arguing that liquidated damages clauses
may create incentives to induce breach); Comment, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract
Damages, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 1055 (1978) [hereinafter, Comment, Liquidated Damages]
(same).
301. See Schwartz, supra note 299, at 274 (“Specific performance is the most accurate
method of achieving the compensation goal of contract remedies because it gives the promisee
the precise performance that he purchased.”). Specific performance may be coupled with damages to compensate the nonbreaching party for a loss because of the delay in performance.
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specific performance is not practicable—for example, where supervising the performance would impose a great burden on the court.302
Moreover, a breacher who wishes to avoid specific performance may
be able to do so relatively easily by selling the goods in question to an
innocent third party.303 In each of these circumstances, protecting contractual entitlements with a property rule requires more than relaxing
the limitations on specific performance. It requires a penalty such as
punitive damages that may be imposed when supervision is impractical or performance is no longer possible and that will serve to deter
the breach in the first place.
Liquidated damages may operate as a penalty to deter breach
just like punitive damages. They have the advantage of being expressly agreed to by the promisor, who presumably has calculated
that her gains from agreeing to such a clause outweigh the costs.304 If
courts were willing to enforce in terrorem liquidated damages clauses,
then parties would be able to contract into property-rule protection
when it suited them. The effect of such a rule would be similar to
permitting punitive damages for breach of contract, which the parties
could contract out of at their option. However, liquidated damages
have one major drawback not shared by punitive damages: they are
payable regardless of whether the contract was breached willfully or
involuntarily.305 As a number of writers have observed, this can create
an incentive for the promisee to act opportunistically and attempt to
induce a breach by the promisor in order to collect the liquidated
damages.306 This is particularly problematic where the promisor’s performance requires the promisee’s cooperation, as in many construc-

302. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 366 (stating that specific performance may be denied where difficulty in supervision outweighs its advantages); Ulen, supra note 18, at 398
(“One of the most troubling issues in making specific performance the routine remedy for
breach of contract is that there may be circumstances in which the costs to the court of supervising the performance of the breacher may be inefficiently high.”).
303. See Kronman, supra note 15, at 377 (noting this possibility). Kronman argues for the
imposition of a constructive trust on the breaching party’s profits in order to weaken her incentive to breach the original contract without having first negotiated a release. See id. at 377, 38082.
304. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 142.
305. An in terrorem liquidated damages clause that exempted involuntary breaches would
be equivalent to awarding punitive damages for willful breach. The only difference would be
whether the default rule would be property-rule protection (which would be the case with punitive damages) or liability-rule protection (which would be the case with such a liquidated damages clause). For further discussion of default rules, see supra Part II.C.2.c.
306. See, e.g., Clarkson et al., supra note 300, at 368-72; Goetz & Scott, supra note 18, at
588; Comment, Liquidated Damages, supra note 300, at 1080.
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tion contracts, for example.307 Liquidated damages clauses can discourage good faith modifications to avoid breach for the same reason: the promisee has little incentive to agree to a modification unless
doing so would be worth more to him than the liquidated damages.308
Punitive damages do not raise the same concerns because they would
be imposed only upon a showing that the promisor’s breach was willful. The promisee would have no incentive to induce breach because
a breach that was not the result of the promisor’s deliberate choice
would not entitle the promisee to more than expectation damages.
Nor would the promisee be inclined to refuse a modification to avert
breach because of circumstances beyond the promisor’s control.
Thus, punitive damages may be preferable to enforcing in terrorem
liquidated damages clauses.309
Punitive damages are the missing piece of the property-rule puzzle. When specific performance is practical, it may be the better remedy because it gives the promisee precisely what he bargained for.
When specific performance is not possible, however, punitive damages are necessary to promote negotiations. Moreover, punitive damages may be preferable to liquidated damages because they create no
incentive on the part of the promisee to induce a breach by the
promisor.310
3. A Few Examples of “Efficient” Breach. I have argued above
that punitive damages should be available for any willful breach of
contract. This is not, however, what the law currently permits. Even
307. See Comment, Liquidated Damages, supra note 300, at 1080.
308. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 143; Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation,
Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1218-41 (1994).
309. Judge Posner notes that penalty clauses allow the promisor to communicate information about its reliability to the promisee. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 142. However, a promisor could convey much of the same information by not seeking to limit its liability for punitive
damages in the case of willful breach. The only information that could not be sent if punitive
damages were permitted and penalty clauses were not is information regarding the promisor’s
estimate of the chances that it might breach involuntarily.
310. One could also protect contractual entitlements with a property rule by throwing all
willful breachers in jail. However, such a sanction seems stronger than is needed to encourage
negotiations for a release. It is worth noting that there are other kinds of conduct that are
thought sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of punitive damages but that do not give
rise to criminal sanctions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994) (authorizing punitive damages for employment discrimination where the employer acted “with malice or with reckless
indifference”); see also Kronman, supra note 15, at 375 n.76 (distinguishing breach of contract
from criminal takings on the grounds that: (1) criminal takings may be more difficult to detect
and so require greater deterrence; (2) criminal takings often involve physical violence; and (3)
physical takings are frequently committed by strangers).
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in those states that have been willing to allow punitive damages for
breach of contract, only a few courts have allowed punitive damages
for willful breaches of contract that were not opportunistic. One of
these few is the court that decided Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co.,311 a
case in which the defendant, having agreed to lease commercial space
to the plaintiffs, continued to look for better offers while the
plaintiffs ran up substantial expenses in reliance on the lease.
Continuing to look for better offers constitutes an essential step
towards efficient breach, and the theory of efficient breach would
have permitted the defendants to lease the space to a different party
upon the payment of damages (including the plaintiffs’ substantial
reliance damages). The Hawaii Supreme Court nonetheless
concluded that “[t]he actions of appellants in this case were
reprehensible and clearly amounted to wanton and/or reckless
conduct sufficient to give rise to tort liability.”312
More frequently, however, willfulness alone has not been
deemed sufficient, even in states like New Mexico that allow punitive
damages for breach of contract. In Construction Contracting & Man313
agement, Inc. v. McConnell, for example, the defendant contractor
refused to perform after realizing that the contract would not be
profitable. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial court
properly refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the
jury.314 Referring to the theory of efficient breach, the court stated
that “even an intentional breach, where the nonbreaching party is
fully compensated for his loss, may promote the interests of society as
a whole . . . .”315 The court continued:
[U]nder our economic system, a party’s inability to perform a contract without incurring a substantial financial loss would constitute a
legitimate business reason and, although subjecting the party to full
liability for the nonbreaching party’s compensatory damages, would

311. 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980).
312. Id. at 289. In Chung, the plaintiffs recovered damages for their emotional distress in
tort. See id. at 288-89. Punitive damages were not at issue because the plaintiffs did not appeal
the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on punitive damages. See id. at 287 n.4. Reading the
opinion leaves little doubt, though, that the Hawaii court would have upheld punitive damages
on the facts of the case.
313. 815 P.2d 1161 (N.M. 1991).
314. See id. at 1166.
315. Id. at 1165.

DODGE TO PRINTER.DOC

1999]

04/29/99 4:24 PM

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS

687

not, without more, expose the breaching party to liability for puni316
tive damages.

The threat of punitive damages would not, however, have forced the
construction company to perform the contract at a loss if doing so
was not necessary to protect the nonbreaching party’s expectation interest. The threat of punitive damages would simply have forced the
construction company to buy its way out of the contract and would
have determined the nonbreaching party’s expectation interest more
cheaply and more accurately.
D. Exempting Involuntary Breaches of Contract
Finally, it may be worth asking why punitive damages should not
also be allowed for involuntary breaches of contract.317 Involuntary
breaches are those that do not involve a deliberate decision by the
promisor to breach. They include breaches that arise because of mere
oversight or because the breaching party refuses to perform in the
good faith (though mistaken) belief that her performance is excused
by some defense.318 There are several reasons why such breaches
should not be subject to punitive damages.
First, it is important to reemphasize that the reason for allowing
punitive damages in contracts is not simply to penalize breachers or
to provide additional compensation to nonbreaching parties. Rather,
the reason for allowing punitive damages is to encourage negotiations
for a release because the parties can establish the value of the contractual entitlement more efficiently than a court. Negotiation is not
possible, though, if the decision to breach is not deliberate. If a contractor inadvertently installs the wrong kind of pipe in a house,319 it
would be futile to impose punitive damages in the hopes of forcing
negotiations. Because the contractor had no intention of breaching, it
would never have occurred to her to approach the other party and
ask for permission to install a different kind of pipe. Thus, imposing

316. Id. at 1165-66. It bears emphasizing that the defendant appeared to have no defense
based on either mistake or changed circumstances.
317. On the efficient measure for damages for involuntary breach of contract, see generally
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & I.P.L. Png, Damage Measures for Inadvertent Breach of Contract
(Nov. 1996) (Discussion Paper No. 204, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
at Harvard Law School) (on file with author).
318. See supra text following note 127.
319. This is, of course, what happened in the famous case Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129
N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
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punitive damages for involuntary breaches would not serve to encourage negotiations.
Of course, imposing punitive damages for involuntary breaches
might encourage promisors to take additional precautions against
such breaches—the contractor might double check the brand of pipe
to ensure that it matched the contract specifications—but such additional precautions would not be efficient.320 Precautions are efficient
if they cost less than the amount of the loss they are designed to prevent, discounted by the probability of that loss occurring.321 Investing
in precautions beyond that amount is inefficient—it does not promise
an adequate return on the investment. Punitive damages for involuntary breaches would encourage promisors to take an inefficient
amount of precautions in order to avoid the possibility of punitive
damages.322
Making punitive damages available for involuntary breaches
might have another undesirable effect on promisors: it might discourage them from raising legitimate defenses to performance. Assume
that after a widget manufacturer enters a contract to produce widgets
for A, the cost of a key component triples because of civil strife in the
country producing that component. The manufacturer might have a
good faith claim that her performance is excused on grounds of impossibility, but if she would be liable for punitive damages in the
event that defense failed, she will be less likely to raise the defense.323
Extending punitive damages to involuntary breaches may also
have undesirable effects on the promisee’s incentives. They would
operate much like in terrorem liquidated damages, which are payable
regardless of the reasons for breach. Punitive damages might discourage the promisee from agreeing to a modification that would
320. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 646-47; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 14, at
879 (“If damages equal harm, potential injurers will in theory have socially correct incentives to
take precautions.”).
321. This is Learned Hand’s classic formula for negligence. See United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
322. As I have already noted, punitive damages for willful breach will not result in an inefficient level of precautions because the promisor can avoid such damages simply by not
breaching the contract deliberately. See supra note 266.
Imposing punitive damages for involuntary breaches would also distort the choice of contracting party. Parties who were more likely to breach for reasons beyond their control would
have to charge a premium to insure against the possibility of punitive damages, raising their
prices beyond what their riskiness alone justifies. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 650-53. Punitive damages for willful breach will not result in this distortion either. See supra note 266.
323. For discussion of the argument that awarding punitive damages for willful breach (as I
suggest) might discourage promisors from raising defenses in good faith, see infra Part IV.C.
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avert breach in the hopes of collecting punitive damages. They might
even give the promisee an incentive to induce the promisor to
breach.324
A final reason for exempting involuntary breaches from punitive
damages is that they simply do not involve the level of culpability
traditionally required for punitive damages. In torts, for example,
punitive damages are not awarded for mere negligence.325 Punitive
damages are awarded, however, where the defendant acted willfully326
or with reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights.327 Extending punitive damages to cover willful breaches of contract is consistent with
the standard for punitive damages generally applied in torts, but
awarding punitive damages for involuntary breaches would not be.328
324. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Badger v. Paulson Inv. Co., 803 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Or. 1991) (“The prerequisite
for imposition of punitive damages is a degree of culpability greater than inattention or simple
negligence.”); Cabe v. Lunich, 640 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ohio 1994) (“Something more than mere
negligence is always required before an award of punitive damages may be made.”). Some
states allow punitive damages for gross negligence, see, e.g., Taylor v. Browning, 927 P.2d 873,
884 (Idaho 1996); Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 594, 597 (N.M. 1995), but others do
not, see, e.g., Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 267, 276 (Md. 1998); J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v.
Doss, 899 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ark. 1995).
326. See, e.g., Taylor, 927 P.2d at 884 (“The justification for punitive damages must be that
the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed ‘malice,
oppression, fraud or gross negligence;’ ‘malice, oppression, wantonness;’ or simply ‘deliberate
and willful.’” (quoting Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 465 (Idaho 1996)
(quoting Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661, 669 (Idaho 1983)))); Sorrentino v.
All Seasons Serv., Inc., 717 A.2d 150, 161 (Conn. 1998) (“To support an award of punitive
damages, the evidence must reveal ‘a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.’” (quoting Gargano v. Heyman, 525 A.2d 1343,
1347 (Conn. 1987))).
327. See, e.g., Cummings v. Sea Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 1011, 1022 (Alaska 1996)
(“’[R]eckless indifference to the rights of others, and conscious action in deliberate disregard of
them . . . may provide the necessary state of mind to justify punitive damages.’” (quoting Barber v. National Bank, 815 P.2d 857, 864 (Alaska 1991))); Taylor v. Medenica, 479 S.E.2d 35, 46
(S.C. 1996) (“In order for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, there must be evidence the
defendant’s conduct was willful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.”).
328. Some may argue that because contractual liability is a form of strict liability, distinguishing between willful and involuntary breaches is inappropriate. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra
note 1, at 1147 (“In its essential design . . . our system of remedies for breach of contract is one
of strict liability and not of liability based on fault . . . .”). It is true that contractual liability is
“strict” in the sense that a breaching party is liable for damages even if the breach was involuntary. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 235(2) (“When performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is a breach.”). It is not true, though, that fault is irrelevant in
determining remedies for breach of contract. See generally Marschall, supra note 14, at 735-36.
The willfulness of a breach is a key factor in determining whether the nonbreaching party is
entitled to the cost of completion or simply to the diminution in value. See, e.g., Groves v. John
Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 236 (Minn. 1939); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891
(N.Y. 1921); see also Sebert, supra note 14, at 1644-46 (characterizing the use of the cost-of-
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III. PRELIMINARY RESPONSES TO SOME ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS
In the preceding discussion, I have already dealt with a number
of possible objections to my proposal—that punitive damages will
discourage “efficient” breaches,329 that awarding attorneys’ fees
would be sufficient,330 and that fault is irrelevant in determining contract remedies.331 There are, however, a few other predictable objections that deserve separate treatment.
A. Collapse the Boundaries Between Contract and Tort
A number of courts have expressed a fear that allowing punitive
damages for breach of contract will collapse the traditional boundaries between contract and tort.332 Even if recognizing breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tort, as some
states do, creates this possibility, allowing contracts plaintiffs to recover punitive damages directly, as other states have, does not.333 All
this Article proposes is that punitive damages be available for willful
breaches of contract in order to discourage such breaches and encourage negotiations. I do not suggest that other distinctions between

completion measure against a willful breacher as a covert form of punitive damages). An intentional deviation from a contract may be grounds for denying restitution to the breaching party.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 374 cmt. b. And against a willful breacher, the requirement
that damages be proved with reasonable certainty is relaxed. See id. § 352 cmt. a (“A court may
take into account all the circumstances of the breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether
to require a lesser degree of certainty . . . .”). Thus, contract law already distinguishes between
willful and involuntary breaches in the context of remedies, and awarding punitive damages for
willful breaches would simply make one more contract remedy turn on that distinction.
329. See supra Part II.C.
330. See supra note 265.
331. See supra note 328.
332. See, e.g., Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988) (“‘Care must
be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of contract into an independent tort action through the bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and fair dealing.’”
(quoting Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (Ill. App. 1982))); Freeman &
Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 677 (Cal. 1995) (stating that recognizing breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tort has “the potential for converting
every contract breach into a tort”); Cramer v. Insurance Exch. Agency, 675 N.E.2d 897, 904
(Ill. 1996) (“To allow a bad-faith action would transform many breach of contract actions into
independent tort actions.”); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, “Contracts Is Not Dead”, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1034, 1037-38 (1992) (citing Foley’s limitation of Seaman’s as evidence that
contract law is not dead).
333. For a discussion of the difference between awarding punitive damages directly in contract actions and awarding them indirectly by recognizing certain breaches of contract as torts,
see supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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contract and tort law, such as liability for unforeseeable harm, be
abolished.
B. Increase Litigation and Decrease Settlement
Some courts have suggested that awarding punitive damages in
contract actions will increase litigation. For instance, Judge Kozinski
has written: “Seaman’s throws kerosene on the litigation bonfire by
holding out the allure of punitive damages, a golden carrot that entices into court parties who might otherwise be inclined to resolve
their differences.”334 Such an argument assumes, though, that the
number of contract breaches would remain the same once punitive
damages were allowed. In fact, making punitive damages available
for willful breach of contract will encourage promisors who would
previously have been inclined to breach to negotiate with their
promisees for releases. By decreasing the number of breaches, the
threat of punitive damages should decrease the amount of contracts
litigation.335
A related argument is that the need for courts to distinguish between willful and involuntary breaches will increase the cost of contracts litigation. It is not clear, however, that distinguishing between
willful and involuntary breaches is any more difficult than distinguishing between opportunistic and efficient breaches, as Judge Posner would have courts do.336 Moreover, the law of contract remedies
already requires courts to determine whether a breach was willful in a
number of different contexts.337 Besides, even if it is true that distin334. Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring). The Indiana Supreme Court has also expressed fear about opening “‘the floodgates of punitive damages in contract cases’” and letting “‘all disputes and quarrels over broken
contracts and disappointed business ventures become the subject of acrimonious litigation over
punitive damages.’” Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975,
984 (Ind. 1993) (quoting Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Terre Haute Indus., 507 N.E.2d 588,
617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).
335. See Diamond, supra note 14, at 449:
If the sanctions imposed for bad faith breach are sufficient to induce commencement
of litigation by the promisee, they are also sufficient to induce avoidance of the
breach by the promisor . . . . To the extent the tort deters wrongful conduct, and it
surely will, it will decrease the need for litigation.
See also Kronman, supra note 15, at 373 (“[I]f all promises were specifically enforceable . . . a
resulting increase in the voluntary transfer of contract rights might lower the number of
breaches—and perhaps even of lawsuits—and in this way reduce the actual involvement of
courts in contractual relationships.”).
336. See supra notes 136-37, 145, 194 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 328.
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guishing between willful and involuntary breaches will increase litigation costs in those cases that go to trial, these costs should be more
than offset by the decrease in the number of breaches and the corresponding decrease in the amount of contracts litigation.
It is more difficult to predict the effect that allowing punitive
damages for willful breaches of contract will have on settlements.
Mitchell Polinsky suggests that punitive damages cases may be more
likely to settle because greater stakes mean greater risks for both parties and greater litigation costs.338 On the other hand, he also notes
that in punitive damage cases the parties may be more likely to disagree about the expected recovery at trial, which would tend to make
settlement less likely.339 Because both scenarios are plausible, the possible effect of punitive damages on settlement should be counted neither as an argument in favor of, nor as an argument against, allowing
such damages for willful breaches of contract.340
It does seem reasonable to think that the threat of punitive damages would tend to increase the size of settlements in cases of willful
breach.341 This should not, however, be cause for alarm. The promisor
can avoid the possibility of a larger settlement in the same way that
she can avoid the possibility that a jury would award punitive damages: by negotiating a release from her contractual obligations rather
than committing a willful breach.
C. Discourage Meritorious Defenses
A more serious concern is that the threat of punitive damages
would discourage contract defendants from raising meritorious defenses. The California Court of Appeal cited this fear in refusing to

338. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and
Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663, 667-68 (1997).
339. See id. at 669-70.
340. There is currently almost no empirical data on the effect of punitive damages on settlements and the obstacles to obtaining such data are daunting. See Tom Baker, Transforming
Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211,
212-13; Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L.
REV. 169, 208-09; Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, The Shadow of Punitives: An
Unsuccessful Effort to Bring it into View, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 157, 159, 164-66.
341. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623, 625 (1997) (“[P]retrial effects should reflect what juries have done in prior cases.”).
However, even here, one must proceed with caution. As Tom Baker has noted: “It is to be expected that punitive damages claims and higher settlements will be closely correlated, but that
does not mean that the one causes the other . . . . [T]he far more plausible causal connection is
between aggravated fault and the settlement amount.” Baker, supra note 340, at 213.
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extend Seaman’s from bad faith denial of a contract’s existence to
bad faith denial of contractual liability.342 If punitive damages were
allowed for bad faith denials of liability, the court reasoned, “then
any party attempting to defend a disputed contract claim would risk,
at the very least, exposure to the imposition of tort damages and an
expensive and time-consuming expansion of the litigation into an inquiry as to the motives and state of mind of the breaching party.”343
Certainly one would not want to impose punitive damages on a
contract defendant simply for having raised an unsuccessful defense.
Such liability would indeed chill potentially valid defenses because
the defendant would have to consider the possibility that the defense,
though well-founded, might be rejected by the jury, exposing him to
punitive damages. I have defined “willful breach,” however, to exclude nonperformance that is voluntary but is based on a good faith
belief that performance is excused by some defense.344
The argument that preserving the right to raise defenses in bad
faith is necessary to protect the right to raise defenses in good faith is
harder to make. It assumes that juries are not capable of distinguishing claims for which there is probable cause from claims for which
there is not. Yet juries are asked to make precisely that determination in the majority of states that recognize the tort of wrongful civil
proceedings.345 One might suspect that there is some valid reason for
treating plaintiffs who act in bad faith differently from defendants
who act in bad faith because only one state expressly recognizes a

342. See DuBarry Int’l v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181, 193-94 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
343. Id.; see also Putz & Klippen, supra note 53, at 478:
If tort liability were to be imposed for unreasonable denials of contractual liability,
institutional defendants might choose to pay claims when they believed they had
valid defenses rather than risk even a minor exposure to punitive damages if a jury
disagreed with the reasonableness of the defendant’s position and found that its actions were “oppressive.”
344. See supra text following note 127.
345. The California Supreme Court relied on this analogy in permitting punitive damages
for “stonewalling” in Seaman’s:
There is little difference, in principle, between a contracting party obtaining excess
payment [by threatening a lawsuit without probable cause], and a contracting party
seeking to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by adopting a
“stonewall” position (“see you in court”) without probable cause and with no belief
in the existence of a defense.
Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984) (per curiam).
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tort of malicious defense346 while most states recognize the tort of
wrongful civil proceedings.347 The argument generally used to support
the distinction is that the defendant has been “involuntarily haled
into court.”348 As the California Supreme Court stated:
“The plaintiff sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and
maliciously, he is the cause of the defendant’s damage. But the defendant stands only on his legal rights,—the plaintiff having taken
his case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling upon him
to prove it to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, and he is guilty of
349
no wrong in exercising this privilege.”

When a defendant intentionally breaches a contract and forces the
plaintiff to sue her for damages, though, it seems wrong to say that
the plaintiff is in court “voluntarily” and that the defendant is not. “A
defendant who, in bad faith, forces a plaintiff to prove the validity of
an obligation or debt that the parties know to be legitimate has in effect precipitated the litigation by the unjustified refusal to pay.”350
In short, a promisee does not breach willfully if she had a good
faith belief that her performance is excused. So long as juries are
346. See Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995) (recognizing tort of malicious defense). A few other states have hinted that they might do the same. See Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 529 P.2d 608, 616 (Cal. 1974) (holding that action for malicious prosecution
may be based on the defendant’s filing of cross-pleading); Cisson v. Pickens Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
186 S.E.2d 822, 825 (S.C. 1972) (dictum) (“[I]t would appear that an action for malicious prosecution may be predicated on the interposition of a defense by a defendant, where the other
conditions of an action for malicious prosecution are met.”).
347. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 889 (5th
ed. 1984).
348. Bertero, 529 P.2d at 615. Two other arguments are sometimes raised against the tort of
malicious defense: (1) the defendant must have breathing room to assert his rights; and (2) recognizing such a tort would multiply the number of lawsuits. See Jonathan K. Van Patten &
Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in
Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 917-21 (1984). There might be some truth to the first,
but it applies equally to plaintiffs. See id. at 918-19. The second has not been borne out by experience with the tort of wrongful civil proceedings. See id. at 921. Moreover, as I have already
argued, the threat of punitive damages should decrease the number of lawsuits. See supra notes
334-35 and accompanying text.
349. Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 4 P. 1106, 1109-10 (Cal. 1884) (quoting John D. Lawson,
The Action for the Malicious Prosecution of a Civil Suit, 21 AM. L. REG. 281, 370 (1882)); see
also Baxter v. Brown, 111 P. 430, 431 (Kan. 1910) (declining to recognize tort of malicious defense):
Indeed, it has been said that self-defense is the first law of nature, and one who
physically assaults another cannot recover damages of the other for physical injuries
inflicted so long as the other acts simply on the defensive and does no more than is
necessary to repel the attack . . . .
350.

Van Patten & Willard, supra note 348, at 920.
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trusted to distinguish between good and bad faith claims, there
should be no fear that imposing punitive damages for willful breaches
of contract will chill contract defendants from raising defenses in
good faith.
D. Unpredictability and Jury Discretion
Some courts have worried that punitive damages for breach of
contract are unpredictable and give too much discretion to the jury.
“In inventing the tort of bad faith denial of a contract,” Judge Kozinski has written, “the California Supreme Court has created a cause of
action so nebulous in outline and so unpredictable in application that
it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window than a
rule of law.”351
Judge Kozinski’s simile notwithstanding, recent empirical research shows that punitive damages tend to correlate strongly with a
plaintiff’s actual damages.352 Even when there is a great disparity between the compensatory and the punitive damages awarded, this disparity may result from the failure of the compensatory damages to
capture all of the harm to the plaintiff because of limitations on expectation damages such as certainty and foreseeability. For example,
in Story v. City of Bozeman,353 the Montana case that limited punitive
damages in contracts to cases involving “special relationships,”354 the
jury had awarded $13,236 in expectation damages and $360,000 in
punitive damages, leading the Montana Supreme Court to comment
that “[t]his great disparity between contract and tort damages is
symptomatic of a common problem in the use of the bad faith tort in
contract litigation; the ‘tort tail’ has begun to wag the ‘contract
dog.’”355 On retrial, however, the jury awarded Story $850,000 in expectation and compensatory damages!356

351. Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
352. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 341.
353. 791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990).
354. See id. at 776.
355. Id. at 772.
356. See Story v. City of Bozeman, 856 P.2d 202, 207 (Mont. 1993). An alternative explanation would be that the jury was seeking to punish the defendant under the guise of compensatory damages. See Baker, supra note 340, at 214 (predicting that if punitive damages are limited
or banned “what is likely to happen is that ‘punishment’ will come increasingly in the guise of
‘compensation’”).
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The concern that punitive damages give too much discretion to
the jury is longstanding,357 but it is not limited to punitive damages in
contracts. Moreover, there are ways to control jury discretion in
awarding punitive damages without going so far as to prohibit such
damages entirely. For example, a majority of states now require that
a plaintiff prove the conduct warranting punitive damages by clear
and convincing evidence.358 Review by the trial judge and by appellate
courts may also limit excessive punitive damage awards.359 Or a state
might choose to vest the decision of how much, if any, punitive damages to award in the judge rather than the jury, as Kansas and Connecticut have done.360
E. Stability in Contractual Relations
Finally, a number of courts have cited “the need for stability and
predictability in commercial affairs”361 as a reason for denying punitive damages in contracts. One can think about stability from the
point of view of the promisor and from the point of view of the
promisee. From the promisor’s point of view, some courts have suggested that the rule against punitive damages promotes stability because it allows the promisor to predict its potential liability in the

357. See, e.g., Tynberg v. Cohen, 13 S.W. 315, 317 (Tex. 1890) (“A power such as may be
exercised by juries in awarding exemplary damages is liable to great abuse . . . . [J]uries, under
commendable impulses, but with judgment warped by passion, no doubt often render excessive
verdicts . . . .”).
358. Thirty states and the District of Columbia have adopted the “clear and convincing”
standard for punitive damages either by statute or judicial decision. See Rodriguez v. Suzuki
Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 & nn.1-2 (Mo. 1996) (listing statutes and cases). Section
5(a)(2) of the Model Punitive Damages Act also requires clear and convincing evidence.
On the other hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court has recently held that the Mississippi
statute requiring clear and convincing evidence for punitive damages does not apply to contract
suits. See American Funeral Assurance Co. v. Hubbs, 700 So. 2d 283, 285-86 (Miss. 1997). Thus,
in Mississippi, a contract plaintiff need only establish conduct that warrants punitive damages
by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 286.
359. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 6.2-6.3,
at 346-53 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing a trial court’s power to order remittitur or a new trial);
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (holding a punitive damages
award unconstitutional); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1991)
(explaining and approving Alabama’s procedures for appellate review of punitive damages).
360. See GEN. STAT. CONN. §§ 31-290a(b), 35-53(b), 36a-618, 42-110g(a), 46a-98(d), 52240b (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(a) (1994). Whether doing so would violate the Seventh Amendment or analogous provisions in the constitutions of the states is an open question.
See Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179,
183-207 (1998).
361. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1995).
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event of breach.362 A promisor, however, may obtain at least the same
predictability under a rule allowing punitive damages for willful
breach simply by negotiating a release from the promisee. Indeed,
negotiation offers the promisor greater predictability since she will
know exactly what she must pay to get out of the contract, whereas
there is always some uncertainty in the assessment of damages.
Strangely, some courts have also suggested that barring punitive
damages promotes the promisee’s interest in stability.363 A promisee
who may only recover expectation damages will never be sure,
though, if the promisor will perform or will choose to breach and pay
damages. If the promisee fears that expectation damages will fall
short of his actual damages, he may expend time and resources insuring against the possibility of breach. On the other hand, a promisee who may recover punitive damages for a willful breach can be
assured that the promisor will not breach intentionally without consulting him first, which gives the promisee a measure of stability not
provided by expectation damages.
Courts sometimes make the related argument that “[p]arties
would be more reluctant to join in contractual relationships, or would
expend more effort explicitly defining such relationships, if they
faced the prospect of damages which could be out of proportion to
the amounts involved in the contract.”364 Because liability for punitive
damages would require proof of a willful breach, it seems unlikely
that the parties would need to spend more effort spelling out their
obligations in the contract, as they might if punitive damages were
available for inadvertent breaches too. Promisors should not be deterred from entering contracts by the possibility of punitive damages
for willful breach since such damages could be avoided prospectively
by prohibiting them in the contract365 or retrospectively by negotiating a release. Promisees should be encouraged to enter contracts by
362. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 981
(Ind. 1993) (“[T]he well-defined parameters of compensatory and consequential damages
which may be assessed against a promisor who decides for whatever reason not to live up to his
bargain lend . . . needed . . . stability and predictability to the free enterprise system . . . .”
(quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1977))).
363. See, e.g., Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 500 (S.D. 1997)
(“‘[W]hile compensatory damages encourage reliance on business agreements, the threat of
additional punitive damages would create uncertainty and apprehension in the marketplace.’”
(quoting 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 359, at § 7.2, at 376)).
364. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 446 (Del. 1996).
365. This would be equivalent to the promisee negotiating an explicit option to breach. Presumably the promisee would be required to pay something for this right.
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the possibility of punitive damages since they would be more assured
of performance.
Thus, contrary to the fears of many courts, stability in contractual relations is likely to be promoted by a rule permitting punitive
damages for willful breaches of contract. As the New Mexico Supreme Court has said, “[o]verreaching, malicious, or wanton conduct
such as targeted by [punitive damages] is inconsistent with legitimate
business interests, violates community standards of decency, and
tends to undermine the stability of expectations essential to contractual relationships.”366
CONCLUSION
The majority of American jurisdictions do not allow punitive
damages for breach of contract unless the breach constitutes an independent tort or falls within a few other limited exceptions. Even
among those states that do allow punitive damages in the absence of
an independent tort, very few permit them simply upon a showing
that the contract was willfully breached. Increasingly, courts have
turned to the theory of efficient breach to explain why punitive damages may not be recovered.
Efficiency, however, supports a very different rule from the one
most courts employ—a rule allowing punitive damages for any willful
breach of contract. At a minimum, courts concerned with efficiency
should permit the recovery of punitive damages on a showing that the
breach was opportunistic. Opportunistic breaches by definition do
not increase societal wealth. They have “no economic justification
and ought simply to be deterred.”367 For example, punitive damages
should be permitted where an employee is fired for pretextual reasons,368 where a party engages in “stonewalling” by denying contractual liability in bad faith,369 and where a party refuses in bad faith to
pay for goods or services received.370

366. Romero v. Mervyn’s, 784 P.2d 992, 1001 (N.M. 1989).
367. POSNER, supra note 4, at 130.
368. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Nev. 1987); see also supra Part
II.B.3.a.
369. See Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (per
curiam); see also supra Part II.B.3.b.
370. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 670-71 (Cal. 1995);
see also supra Part II.B.3.c.
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Efficiency also supports extending liability for punitive damages
beyond opportunistic breaches to those that are, in theory,
“efficient.” This Article has argued that the threat of punitive damages will not require inefficient performance but will simply require
the promisor to negotiate with the promisee for a release from her
contractual obligations. Whether such negotiations are more efficient
than allowing the promisor to breach and pay damages turns on a
comparison of the costs of negotiation and the costs of litigation. This
Article has shown that the transaction costs of negotiation, while not
negligible, are generally lower than the assessment costs of litigation.
The problem of strategic behavior that complicates negotiations in a
situation of bilateral monopoly also affects litigation. Litigation,
however, involves other costs that need not be incurred in negotiations, such as the cost of hiring lawyers, the costs of informing the
court, and the error costs of misdetermining damages. While one
might encourage negotiations through other “property rules” like
specific performance and in terrorem liquidated damages, each of
these has limitations that suggest that punitive damages are necessary
to ensure that promisors negotiate rather than breach willfully.
Nor will punitive damages increase the amount of litigation or
undermine the stability of contractual relations as many have feared.
Such arguments ignore the fact that the threat of punitive damages
for willful breach will decrease the number of breaches. Fewer
breaches should mean less litigation as well as greater stability and
predictability in contracts. Allowing punitive damages for willful
breaches of contract is the best way to encourage negotiations by the
parties and to reduce the number of occasions on which damages of
any sort need be awarded.

